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I. INTRODUCTION
In Miranda v. Arizona," the United States Supreme Court held
that the prosecution must demonstrate the use of procedural
safeguards to secure a suspect's privilege against self incrimination
before it could introduce statements elicited from the suspect during
*Dedicated to the memory of my lovely mother.
The author would like to thank Sharon Sperling and Susan Turner for their help with earlier
drafts of this note.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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custodial interrogation.2 Miranda mandated two conditions precedent
to admissibility of such statements: appropriate warnings3 and a valid
waiver. 4 However, the Court has since narrowed the scope of Miranda.
In New York v. Quarles,5 the Court recognized the need for an
exception to Miranda when police must defuse an immediate threat
to public safety.6 The Court observed in situations that threaten the
public safety, Miranda warnings discourage suspects from answering
police inquiries necessary to defuse the danger. 7 Balancing the compet-
ing interests, the Court declared that 'the need for answers to ques-
tions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the
need for the prophylactic rule protecting the fifth amendment privilege
against self incrimination."8
Quarles, therefore, instituted the "public safety exception" to
Miranda, and that exception has since developed a convoluted history.
The Supreme Court has not confronted the exception since it decided
Quarles in 1984. However, all levels of state courts, and federal district
and circuit courts, have addressed the Quarles decision. The lower
2. Id. at 444. For a contemporary debate on the logic and legitimacy of Miranda, compare
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1987) and Schulhofer, The Fifth
Amendment at Justice: A Reply, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 950 (1987) with Markman, The Fifth
Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to 'Reconsidering Miranda', 54 U. CHl.
L. REv. 938 (1987).
3. Absent other equivalent means to protect the suspect's fifth amendment privilege, police
must inform the suspect before interrogation of his right to remain silent and that anything he
says may be used against him. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-69. Police must also inform the suspect
of the right to counsel, to have counsel present during interrogation, and to have the court
appoint counsel if the suspect is indigent. Id. at 469-73; see infra notes 18-19 and accompanying
text.
4. The government carries the burden of proving waiver by the defendant. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 475. See cf Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1984); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484-85 (1981). The defendant, however, carries the burden of establishing that he did not
waive his rights in a habeas corpus hearing. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938).
5. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
6. Id. at 655-60; cf. Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 52-53 (1986). In
England, neither the Judge's Rules nor the Code contains an explicit public safety exception to
the caution requirements. However, the duty to caution a suspect is not as broad as it appears.
The type of questioning in Quarles would arguably be permitted under the Code, at least when
it occurs before formal arrest. Cautions are excused only when 'it is impracticable to do so by
reason of [the arrestee's] condition or behavior at the time." Id. at 53. Certainly the English
rules provide enough latitude for a public safety exception similar to our own. Id.
7. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
8. Id. The outcome of this balancing test was the "public safety exception" to Miranda. Id.
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courts have confronted the public safety exception twenty-seven times
with inconsistent results.9
The courts have adopted three approaches to deciding Quarles-type
cases.10 First, some courts circumvent the exception for a variety of
reasons. Some alternative grounds for decisions are valid, while others
are mere pretexts to avoid the confusion of the exception. Other alter-
native grounds are combined with the exception to achieve a collective
basis for admitting incriminating evidence. Second, some courts at-
tempt to confine Quarles factually, establishing conditions precedent
such as a missing weapon, a time constraint, or the possibility of an
undetected accomplice. Third, some courts simply misapply the excep-
tion, either overlooking grounds for admission or exclusion, or extend-
ing Quarles to situations that pose no threat to the public safety.
This note reviews the current condition of the fifth amendment
privilege. It then surveys the difficulties lower courts have confronted
in their recent interpretations of the public safety exception. Finally,
this note considers the difficulty of attaining, and the significant need
for, judicial consistency that protects both the spirit of Miranda and
public safety.
9. The lower courts' experience with Quarles is limited to cases decided between 1984 and
1988. See United States v. Ochoa Victoria, 852 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Padilla,
819 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. Eaton, 676 F. Supp. 362 (D. Me. 1988); Fiorenza v. Sullivan, No. 85
Civ. 0592 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985) (WESTLAW, DCTU database); Edwards v. State, 515 So.
2d 86 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Hubbard v. State, 500 So. 2d 1204 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Barlow
v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1652, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); People v.
Gilliard, 189 Cal. App. 3d 285, 234 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Cole, 165
Cal. App. 3d 41, 211 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Ruiz, 526 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1988); People v. Roundtree, 135 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 482 N.E.2d 693 (App. Ct. 1985); In
re B.R., 133 Ill. App. 3d 946, 479 N.E.2d 1084 (App. Ct. 1985); State v. Hazley, 428 N.W.2d
406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Jackson, 756 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Turner, 716 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re A.S., 227 N.J. Super. 541, 548 A.2d 202
(App. Div. 1988); State v. Coburn, 221 N.J. Super. 586, 535 A.2d 531 (App. Div. 1987); In re
John C., 130 A.D.2d 246, 519 N.Y.S.2d 223 (App. Div. 1987); People v. Chatman, 122 A.D.2d
148, 504 N.Y.S.2d 703 (App. Div. 1986); State v. Moore, No. 54-CA-86 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
4, 1987) (WESTLAW, OH-CA database); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225 (1985);
Commonwealth v. Logan, No. 106 E.D. 1982 (Pa. Oct. 18, 1988) (WESTLAW, ALLSTATES
database); DeLeon v. State, No. C14-86-930-CR (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1988) (WESTLAW,
ALLSTATES database); State v. Kunkel, 132 Wis. 2d 172, 404 N.W.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1987).
10. A fourth grouping would include cases that fall clearly within the exception. See Padilla,
819 F.2d at 952; Hubbard, 500 So. 2d at 1204; State v. Moore, No. 54-CA-86 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
4, 1987) (WESTLAW, OH-CS database); Coburn, 221 N.J. Super. at 586, 535 A.2d at 531;
Turner, 716 S.W.2d at 462; Chatman, 122 A.D.2d at 148, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
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II. MIRANDA
Miranda revamped the law of confessions in criminal proceedings.
Before Miranda, courts excluded incriminating statements made in-
voluntarily,, or absent a recognized right to counsel. 2 Miranda altered
that practice by establishing a per se rule excluding incriminating
11. A brief review of the birth of Miranda may be helpful. Pre-Miranda, the prosecution
could admit only voluntary confessions at trial. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944)
(voluntariness of confession determined by suspect's "mental freedom" while confessing or deny-
ing participation in a crime); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (use of confession obtained
after suspect was whipped and burned is fourteenth amendment due process violation); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (confession obtained after continued confinement, threats, and
physical abuse was involuntary and excluded as due process violation). Because the interrogation
procedure was considered part of the conviction process, it was subject to fourteenth amendment
due process requirements. However, the Court's focus on the trustworthiness of confessions in
the pre-Miranda days obscured the boundaries of the voluntariness standard. See Note, New
York v. Quarles: The Dissolution of Miranda, 30 VILL. L. REV. 441 nn.10-31 (1985). The
concept of the fifth amendment as the constitutional basis of excluding coerced confessions is
actually nothing new. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) ("[W]hether a
confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [the] . . . Fifth
Amendment .... "). The Court ignored the constitutional underpinnings of Brain in subsequent
decisions, although the Miranda court found it reliable. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461-62. Brain's
relevance to subsequent decisions was questionable until incorporation of the fifth amendment
67 years later. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In the
years between Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) and Miranda, psychological coercion
joined physical brutality as "involuntary" for fourteenth amendment due process purposes. See
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (condemning psychologically coercive practice of
prolonged incommunicado detention and interrogation). The Court also began to shift its focus
from the unreliability of coerced confessions to the need for fair police practices. See, e.g.,
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). In Rochin, after police forcibly pumped suspect's
stomach to obtain incriminating narcotics, the Court said that although the statements may
have been independently established as true, "[c]oerced confessions offend[ed] the community's
sense of fair play and decency." Ultimately, the Court's inability to define "voluntariness,"
coupled with the inconsistencies of case by case review helped put the voluntariness doctrine
out to pasture. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). For a discussion of the voluntariness
doctrine, see Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV.
859 (1979).
12. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. The right to counsel attaches at trial and at "critical stages" before trial, but after initiation
of formal proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (government
violated sixth amendment right to counsel by inducing defendant to incriminate himself without
assistance of counsel); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (exclude incriminating statements
made during pre-indictment interrogation when defendant is focus of investigation); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (exclude incriminating statements elicited after indictment
in absence of counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (trial court's failure to appoint
counsel to provide defense at trial violated defendant's right to counsel).
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statements elicited during custodial interrogation not preceded by
police warnings and the suspect's waiver of fifth amendment rights. 13
Miranda requires a two-part inquiry to determine whether the
requisite procedural safeguards have attached: 14 first, whether the
suspect was in custody; and second, whether the police conduct consti-
tuted interrogation.I The modern custody test is whether police have
13. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77. The Miranda majority asserted that the fifth amendment
applied to police interrogations. Id. at 458-65. After considering contemporary interrogation
techniques, the Court stated that custodial interrogations were inherently coercive. Id. at 455-68.
To overcome the inherent compulsion to confess, the Court required procedural safeguards to
secure the privilege against self incrimination. The Court then specified the procedures:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed. The defendant may waive these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Id. at 444; see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
The Court limited its holding to custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. It defined
custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Id. at 444. However, Miranda did not apply to "[general on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process ...."
Id. at 477. Therefore, the Court intended Miranda only to limit police behavior during custodial
interrogation. Id.
The Miranda majority recognized that custodial interrogation necessarily involves subtle
psychological coercion. Id. at 457. The Court referred to police interrogation manuals that
recommended isolation, persistence, an attitude of presumed guilt, and other techniques to
overcome the suspect's will. Id. at 445-58. "An individual swept from familiar surroundings into
police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion
... cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak." Id. at 461. Miranda warnings would
reduce the compulsion by making suspects aware of their rights. Id. at 467. In addition to
overcoming the inherent coercion of the police-dominated environment of the stationhouse, the
Miranda Court sought to establish a per se rule regarding the admissibility of confessions
obtained during custodial interrogation. Id. at 441. "We granted certiorari... to give concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Id. Thus, in aban-
doning the voluntariness test of confessions, the Court elevated warnings or an equivalent
safeguard to constitutional status. Id. at 479. The majority stated:
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation
outweighs the privilege. This argument is not unfamiliar to this Court. The whole
thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed
the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when
it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be
a witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged.
Id. For a discussion of the old voluntariness test of confessions, see supra note 11.
14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
15. Miranda offered the following definition: "By custodial interrogation, we mean question-
ing initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
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significantly restrained the suspect's freedom of action. 16 If the custody
test is satisfied, the inquiry passes to whether police behavior consti-
tuted interrogation. The Miranda Court did not specifically define
interrogation, but excluded voluntary confessions and "[g]eneral on-
the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime" from its hold-
ing.17 After Miranda, the Court more narrowly defined interrogation
as express questioning or its functional equivalent.1 According to this
definition, interrogation encompasses "any words or actions on the
part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and cus-
tody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect."'19
16. This test has both an objective and subjective application. The subjective test is sup-
ported by the logic that the person who actually but unreasonably believes he is under arrest
is subject to the same coercion as the person who reasonably believes he is under arrest. To
avoid the proof problems of the subjective test, most courts apply the objective test of whether
the reasonable man would believe he was under arrest. See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and
the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, & Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 99 (1968). In Orozco
v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325 (1968), police entered the defendant's bedroom, woke him, and
interrogated him about a crime. The police did not issue Miranda warnings before the interro-
gation. Id. at 326. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was in custody because he was
"not free to go where he pleased, but was 'under arrest."' Id. at 325. In Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 493 (1977), however, the defendant voluntarily went to the police station to answer
questions about a burglary and confessed to the crime without the benefit of Miranda warnings.
The Court held that the questioning did not restrict the defendant's freedom in any way. Id.
at 495. Therefore, the Supreme Court has attempted to resolve the custody issue by considering
whether police questioning created the functional equivalent of arrest. For other Supreme Court
cases addressing the custody issue, see Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (no custody
when defendant questioned at roadside pursuant to routine traffic stop); Minnesota v. Murphy,
465 U.S. 420 (1984) (defendant not in custody when he incriminated himself to probation officer);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (defendant who consented to non-coercive
body search not in custody). But see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (defendant
in custody when taken involuntarily to police station).
17. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
18. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1980). The police read Innis his rights
after arresting him on suspicion of murder. Id. at 293-94. Innis claimed his right to counsel.
Id. at 294. While driving Innis to the stationhouse, police discussed their concern that nearby
school children might find the murder weapon. Id. at 294-95. Innis then directed the officers
to the murder weapon. Id. at 295. At trial, Innis sought to suppress his statements and the
weapon because he had not validly waived his right to counsel. Id. at 295-96.
19. Because police did not know of Innis's susceptibility to a plea concerning the safety of
handicapped children, the Court held that police could not foresee his confession. Id. at 302-03.
Therefore, the officers' behavior did not constitute interrogation. Id. at 297-303. The logic of
Innis is questionable. Sympathy for handicapped children is not a particular susceptibility.
Nothing in Innis prevents officers from intentionally trying "the old handicapped children trick"
with the sole purpose of eliciting incriminating responses. It is difficult to imagine an inquiry
more likely to evoke self incrimination than this. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)
(Christian burial speech violated sixth amendment right to counsel).
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III. SEVERING MIRANDA FROM THE CONSTITUTION
Three Supreme Court cases have eroded the constitutional founda-
tions of Miranda. Michigan v. Tucker,20 a cause celebre in fifth amend-
ment jurisprudence,21 intimated that the Constitution does not mandate
Miranda protections.22 In Tucker, the Court admitted the testimony
of a witness discovered through police questioning of the defendant,
who had been informed of the right to counsel, but not of the right
to appointed counsel if he could not afford representation.2 Writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist emphasized a statement by the
Miranda Court that the Constitution did not require a particular sol-
ution to the inherent compulsions of interrogation.2
Although courts and commentators cite Tucker for the proposition
that the Constitution does not require Miranda warnings, Tucker, as
applied, has produced little impact on the fifth amendment. The Su-
preme Court has yet to admit unwarned statements at trial based
solely on Tucker.2 However, the decision may have done more to
weaken Miranda than the Court intended.
The federal courts have no supervisory power over state court
criminal justice.26 If Miranda is not constitutionally required, then the
Court lacks authority to impose Miranda on the states. 7 A prophylac-
tic rule is distinguished from a true constitutional rule by the possibility
of violating the former without actually violating the Constitution."s
20. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
21. For a general discussion of the Tucker decision, see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term,
88 HARv. L. REV. 197 (1974).
22. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46.
23. Id. at 436.
24. Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). However, in the same paragraph from
Miranda quoted by Justice Rehnquist in Tucker, the Court required Miranda warnings "unless
we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of
their right to silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it .... " Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467.
25. Presumably, courts could blatantly ignore Miranda's strictures, then defend their deci-
sions on the basis of Tucker. The Supreme Court Cited Tucker in its Quarles decision, but
admitted the improperly obtained evidence under the public safety exception. See Quarles, 467
U.S. at 653. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his Quarles dissent, the Miranda violation in
Tucker "was technical and the interrogation itself non-coercive." Id. at 684 n.7 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
26. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy,
80 Nw. U.L. REV. 100, 133 (1985).
27. See Y. KAmisAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 577 (6th
ed. 1986) [hereinafter Y. KAMLSAR].
28. Grano, supra note 26, at 105.
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
By severing Miranda from the Constitution, Tucker placed Miranda
outside the scope of the federal courts' Article III rulemaldng author-
ity.- Absent a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court may not
reverse state court decisions. The states may therefore ignore
Miranda.
In Oregon v. Elstad,3° the Supreme Court echoed Tucker's sever-
ance of Miranda from the Constitution. In Elstad, the defendant ar-
gued that the Court should exclude a second confession, preceded by
Miranda warnings and a knowing waiver, as the "fruit" of an earlier
Miranda violation.31 Rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court in-
stead found errors in administering the warnings not to be as severe
a violation as direct infringement on fifth amendment rights.m This
view, like Tucker, has yet to justify the admission of unwarned state-
ments. Nevertheless, these decisions may collectively have eroded
Miranda to the point that warnings are no longer rights, but merepossibilities.s3
IV. THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION: QUARLES
Just after midnight on September 11, 1980, a woman told two
policemen, Officers Kraft and Scarring, that an armed man had raped
29. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 27, at 577.
30. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
31. Id. at 303. The "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine is firmly rooted in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), and Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court held that the government may not introduce
incriminating evidence derived from an illegally obtained source. See New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 647, 688 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.
33. Note, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda v. Arizona - New York v. Quarles, 21
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 188 (1985). Should the Court resist overruling, the trilogy of
Tucker, Elstad, and Quarles depicts the Court balancing defendants' rights against the State's
interest in conviction. Y. KASisAR, supra note 27, at 576-77. In fact, overruling sometimes acts
only as a formality in the deterioration of a legal paradigm. For a detailed discussion of legal
paradigms and their various stages of life and death, see Moffat, Judicial Decision as Paradigm,
37 U. FLA. L. REv. 297 (1985). Professor Moffat noted:
[This] portrait of science provides a picture suggestive of the way that fundamental
legal ideas come into being, live a life, and die out. But an accurate picture of that
process is not available in terms as concrete as the core notion of rules. The core
of the rule suggests a permanence that is unreal. The core does, however, provide
a convenient shorthand, a paradigm, for treating certain kinds of situations in a
particular sort of way. As long as satisfaction with the application of accepted
values to the situation continues, the paradigm remains useful. But when other
factors introduce themselves, the persuasive power of the old paradigm begins to
erode. The search for an alternative begins. Eventually, a new one must emerge.
Id. at 326.
[Vol. 40
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her and that the assailant had entered a nearby supermarket. Officer
Kraft entered the store and saw the suspect, Quarles, who matched
the woman's description. Kraft chased Quarles to the rear of the
store and, after three other officers arrived, frisked him, discovered
an empty shoulder holster, and handcuffed him.3 6 Kraft then asked
Quarles where the gun was.37 Quarles pointed to some empty cartons
and said, "the gun is over there."'
After police retrieved the gun, Quarles agreed to answer questions
without an attorney present.s He admitted that he owned the re-
volver.40 In the prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon, the
trial court excluded both the statements and the revolver because the
police had not issued Miranda warnings before obtaining the evi-
dence. 41 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's suppres-
sion order. 2
The Supreme Court reversed. 3 Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist articulated a public safety exception to the Miranda re-
quirements.M He distinguished prophylactic warnings from the
34. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653.
35. Id. at 652.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 652-53. The State dropped the rape charges without explanation and prosecuted
Quarles for criminal possession of a weapon. Id. at 652-53 & n.2.
42. Id. at 653; People v. Quarles, 85 A.D.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1981) (mem.), affd. 58
N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984; 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982).
43. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660. The majority voted to admit the gun and both the initial and
subsequent statements. Id. at 659. The initial statement was "the gun is over there." The
subsequent statements referred to Quarles's ownership of the gun and where he had purchased
it. Id. at 652. Justice O'Connor concurred on admitting the gun, but dissented from the Court's
holding on the admissibility of Quarles's initial statement. Id. at 660 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued to
exclude the gun and the initial statement. Id. at 688-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Neither Justice
Marshall nor Justice O'Connor addressed the admissibility of the subsequent statements. Presum-
ably, Justice Marshall would vote to exclude the subsequent statements. Justice O'Connor's
feelings on the subsequent statements are less predictable. Her distinction between testimonial
and tangible evidence indicates she would vote to exclude the statement. By extending her
majority opinion in E/stad, however, it is conceivable that Justice O'Connor would view the
subsequent statements as admissible by-products of the validly obtained gun. Cf. Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine does not bar evidence derived
from warned inquiry when same suspect previously incriminated himself in response to unwarned
inquiry).
44. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653-59.
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privilege against self incrimination45 On the Quarles facts, an ac-
complice, customer, or store employee finding the gun might threaten
public safety,46 leading Justice Rehnquist to argue that such exigent
circumstances do not demand Miranda safeguards unless police subject
a suspect to "actual coercion. '' 47 In cases of actual coercion, the
privilege against self incrimination would prevent admission of the
unwarned statements at trial.
Justice Rehnquist also admitted that the exception would increase
the opportunities for police to coerce incriminating statements from
suspects,4 because police can obtain more confessions when suspects
remain ignorant of their rights to silence and counsel. 49 Yet, the
Quarles majority hoped to protect police from instantaneously choosing
between risking the public safety by issuing warnings and risking the
exclusion of evidence by withholding warnings.50 The Court adopted
an objective test5' to relieve police of this difficult choice, requiring
only that unwarned questions be "reasonably prompted by a concern
for the public safety."52
Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for misunderstanding the
critical issues in Miranda.3 Although Miranda allowed police to ask
questions to protect the public, the state, not the defendant, must
bear the burden of protecting the public. 4 She argued, therefore, to
exclude Quarles's unwarned initial statement.5 Separating testimonial
45. Id. at 654.
46. Id. at 657.
47. Id. at 658 n.7.
48. Id. at 656.
49. Id. at 657.
50. Id. at 657-58.
51. Id. at 656. The Court relied on the judgment of police to apply the exception consistently.
Id. at 658-59. Justice Rehnquist noted: "We think police officers can and will distinguish almost
instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public
and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect," and expressly wished
to avoid questioning based on an officer's subjective perception of public safety. Id. at 655-59.
52. Id. at 656. Although the voluntariness test was a prosecution-defendant swearing con-
test, Justice Rehnquist's suggestion permits officers to swear their way to convictions without
a procedural mechanism for defendants' protection. Courts will assess the threat to public safety
by relying on officer testimony. Because defense counsel will have difficulty presenting evidence
that betrays an officer's true motives, the test is arguably more prosecution-oriented than the
voluntariness test. Cf. Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REv. 177,
182 (1984) (juries prefer police testimony to that of criminal defendants who rarely look or talk
like law abiding citizens).
53. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
54. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 664-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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from tangible evidence, Justice O'Connor distinguished the gun and
the suspect's initial statement.5 Only in cases of actual compulsion
would she suppress tangible evidence derived from an unwarned state-
ment.5 7
Although she voted to admit the gun, Justice O'Connor feared that
the majority's opinion offended Miranda. She also cautioned that the
majority's approach would create uncertainties for police, who depend
on courts' differing notions of "objective circumstances" at suppression
hearings.58 The "end result," she believed, "[would] be a finespun new
doctrine . . . [of] hair splitting distinctions" similar to the subtleties
plaguing the fourth amendment.59 Her prediction was accurate.
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, found that the Quarles
facts did not establish a threat to public safety. Because the New
York Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court disagreed whether
exigent circumstances existed,o Justice Marshall questioned police of-
ficers' ability to instantaneously determine whether these cir-
cumstances were present on the street. 61 He also argued that the
majority could not reconcile Miranda with the exception,6 because
Miranda created a "constitutional presumption" that statements made
during custodial interrogation are inherently coercive. Securing pub-
lic safety was no reason to disregard this presumption.6 In fact, he
insisted that because the police subjected Quarles to actual coercion,6
the exception did not apply even under the majority's standard. 6
Finally, Justice Marshall stated that the majority relied too heavily
56. Id. at 666-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 667-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
She referred to a previous decision in which the Court held that a forced blood test did not
constitute testimonial evidence, and therefore did not violate the fifth amendment. Id. at 666-68
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966)).
58. Id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
59. Id. at 663-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 679-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Quarles did not settle whether the exception
applied only to fast-developing, on-the-scene situations. It is possible that suspects may not
immediately speak up. Neither did Quarles address whether police could question such suspects
later. See Pizzi, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in a Rescue Situation, 76 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567, 584 (1985).
62. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 680-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 683-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 684-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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on Tucker, a decision that admitted the fruits of a Miranda violation
"only because the violation was technical and the interrogation non-
coercive." Under Quarles, he noted, the public safety exception ex-
tends beyond such technical Miranda violations.
V. REACTION TO THE QUARLES DECISION
A. Opposition to the Exception
Convinced that this "gaping exception" symbolized the dissolution
of Miranda, scholars questioned whether Miranda might become the
exception to a system grounded in coerced confessions.6 Under
Miranda, only the presumption of coercion during custodial interroga-
tion could avert the determination of whether a suspect subjectively
experienced coercion.69 Aware of the pitfalls of reading suspects'
minds, the Quarles Court sought to avoid the same journey into the
minds of police officers. 70
By refusing to speculate about police motivation, the Court optimis-
tically trusted officers to uphold the spirit of the exception. 71 According
to the Court, officers would distinguish "almost instinctively" between
questions asked to secure safety and those asked to elicit testimonial
evidence from a suspect. 72 But the Court failed to address cir-
cumstances in which officers may have more than one motivation. 73
Quarles never resolved whether public safety must be the primary
motivation, nor how to avoid the potential for abuse of the dual-purpose
question.74 Because the exception ignored the subjective motivations
67. Id. at 684 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. See The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARv. L. REV. 140 (1984) [hereinafter The
Supreme Court]; Note, "Public Safety" Exception to Miranda: The Supreme Court Writes Away
Rights, 61 CH. KENT L. REV. 577 (1985) [hereinafter Note, The Supreme Court Writes Away
Rights]; Note, New York v. Quarles: The Dissolution of Miranda, 30 VILL. L. REV. 441 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, The Dissolution of Miranda]; Note, New York v. Quarles: The Public Safety
Exception to Miranda, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1111 (1985) [hereinafter Note, New York v. Quarles];
Note, supra note 33, at 188; Casenote, Criminal Procedure - Miranda Warning Public Safety
Exception, 1985 S. ILL. U.L.J. 735. But see Comment, New York v. Quarles: The "Public
Safety" Exception to Miranda, 19 U. RIcH. L. REV. 193 (1984).
69. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69.
70. The Supreme Court, supra note 68, at 148. "[M]ost police officers... would act out
of a host of ... unverifiable motives - their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as
well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence .... " Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656.
71. See The Supreme Court, supra note 68, at 148.
72. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658-59.
73. Id. at 656.
74. See Note, New York v. Quarles, supra note 68, at 1126 (officers may interrogate without
issuing Miranda warnings even if their primary motivation is to obtain incriminating evidence);
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of police, dual-purpose questions are not reviewable. In effect, there-
fore, Quarles decided the problem of dual-purpose questions in favor
of the police.
Beyond the problem of dual-purpose questions, Quarles and
Miranda relied on opposing presumptions. Miranda presumed coer-
cion during custodial interrogation in order to preserve broad protec-
tion of a suspect's fifth amendment rights. 75 Quarles, on the other
hand, presumed the good faith of police officers in order to preserve
broad protection of the public's safety.76 Quarles thus shifted the bur-
den of proving coercion to the criminal defendant. By creating the
good faith defense to Miranda violations, the Court placed a premium
on police ignorance of individual susceptibility to coercion.77 In fact,
Quarles may provide incentive for the individual officer seeking con-
victions to misapply the exception. 78 The good faith defense thus favors
the State, because juries tend to accept police testimony at trial.79
Under the majority's "good-faith" scheme, only proof of actual com-
pulsion activates the fifth amendment. 0 The majority's approach essen-
tially resurrects the pre-Miranda voluntariness inquiry., Yet, the
evolution of the voluntariness doctrine leading to Miranda demon-
strated the problems inherent in defining "compulsion."'
Absent actual compulsion, an unwarned statement violates only a
prophylactic rule and remains admissible under the exception 3 There-
fore, a defendant who made incriminating statements that purportedly
fall under the public safety exception must prove that the state over-
Note, supra note 33, at 188 (Quarles permits inquiries under both categories); see also Note,
The Supreme Courts Writes Away Rights, supra note 68, at 591 ("Since custodial interrogation
may serve both purposes, the Court deceives itself by suggesting that the instincts of officers
will render its decision self-executing.").
75. The Supreme Court, supra note 68, at 148-49.
76. Id. at 149.
77. Id.
78. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 122 (P. Kurland
& G. Casper eds.); see Note, The Supreme Court Writes Away Rights, supra note 68, at 592
(ambiguity will supply police officers with incentive to misapply Quarles standard since it is
impossible to ascertain at trial the officer's motivation in asking the questions); cf. Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J. dissenting) (police officers will take advantage
of any ambiguities in constitutional doctrines articulated by the court).
79. See Goldberg, supra note 52.
80. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 n.7.
81. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
82. See id.
83. Therefore, police may rely on coercion to provoke a response in order to avoid danger
to themselves or the public.
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came his will in the interrogation. As a result, traditional fifth amend-
ment interests such as individual dignity and autonomy yield to the
extraconstitutional concept of public safetyr - a concept designed to
prevent possible future harm to unidentified individuals.
Quarles not only inverted Miranda's rationale, but created am-
biguities in the exception itself. Perhaps the Court might have awaited
a case with facts more suitable to a clearer exception. First, the
threat to public safety was minimal in Quarles; police could have found
the gun through a brief search of the area.86 Because the arrest oc-
curred in the middle of the night, the store was empty except for
some clerks.87 Police could have warned the employees about the mis-
sing weapon and cordoned off the store from the public. Presumably,
this measure would have protected the public safety because the al-
leged rape victim never said that Quarles had an accomplice. 9 As a
signpost for reviewing courts, the Quarles facts are weak. Quarles
gives officers carte blanche to aim their guns at an unarmed suspect
and, without issuing Miranda warnings, demand to know the location
of a gun that arguably posed little threat, because it was missing in
an empty store in the middle of the night. °
The second problem with Quarles is that it failed to define the
boundaries of the exception. Would a knife or a crowbar,91 or a bag
of cocaine hidden in the shelves of the supermarket pose a public
danger sufficient to trigger the exception?93 Would a bag of cocaine
threaten public safety if school children were more likely to find it
than adults?9 Would the ongoing danger posed by members of or-
84. The Supreme Court, supra note 68, at 150.
85. Casenote, supra note 68, at 748.
86. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 676 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 651-52 (statement of alleged rape victim), 675 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. Justice Marshall noted that the circumstances of Quarles's arrest were coercive even
under the majority's standard:
In the middle of the night and in the back of an empty supermarket, Quarles was
surrounded by four armed police officers .... Officer Kraft's abrupt and pointed
question pressured Quarles in precisely the way that the Miranda Court feared
the custodial interrogations would coerce self-incriminating testimony.
Id. at 685 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Cf. People v. Cole, 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 211 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (missing
knife reasonably prompted officer concern for public safety).
92. See Note, New York v. Quarles, supra note 68, at 1125 & n.78.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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ganized crime create a blanket exception to all suspected "mafia" mem-
bers? Do public places inherently possess greater potential danger
than residential areas regardless of the number of people present?95
Does the exception require the possibility of a missing accomplice 96 or
time constraint? Can the police detain a suspect indefinitely to extract
information?"7 How many questions are necessary to stabilize a
threatening situation? These questions by no means exhaust the gray
areas of Quarles. Consequently, Quarles offers the lower courts in-
adequate guidelines for determining what circumstances justify the
admission of unwarned responses.9
B. Support for the Exception
Despite its problems, the public safety exception is not without
supporters. 9 One scholar described Quarles as a common sense ap-
proach to "reconcile the realities of effective law enforcement with
the often hypertechnical rules of criminal justice."'1'0 Others preferred
the exception over the spectre of police forced to stand by helplessly
while criminal suspects '"prowl about."''1 One commentator suggested
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1985). In Webb, the suspect
climbed a communications tower and threatened to commit suicide. Id. at 385. The Fifth Circuit
found no custodial interrogation although questioning and negotiations between the suspect,
psychiatrist, and negotiator lasted ten hours. Id. at 390-91. Relegating Quarles to a footnote,
the court said the lack of interrogation made Quarles analysis unnecessary. Id. at 392 n.14.
However, the suspect's safety was of primary concern to the negotiators, making the situation
analogous to Quarles. Id. The court expressly declined to force a choice between Miranda and
neutralizing a crisis situation. Id.
98. See Comment, supra note 68, at 205.
99. For a general discussion of the impropriety of warnings, see Caplan, Questioning
Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); see also F. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION 149 (2d ed. 1948) (criminal suspects must be dealt with 'in a somewhat lower
moral plane than ... ethical, law-abiding citizens"); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 949 (1965) (if your child were kidnapped would
you really care about lawyers and warnings before questioning?); McCormack, The Scope of
Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 24 TEx. L. REV. 239, 241 (1946) (forces of self-interest
operate to make confessions probably true); Pizzi, supra note 61, at 591 (state-individual balance
less important in rescue situation than routine investigative setting); Comment, supra note 68
(Quarles is culmination of Burger Court's conservatism but is traceable to Miranda itself); cf.
infra note 340 (exceptions as presumptions).
100. Rogers, Criminal Law Decisions of the 1983-84 Term: The Court Reaches Out to
Adopt a "Common Sense" Approach, 14 Sup. CT. RESEARCHER 115, 122 (1984).
101. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 16
(1986) (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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that the issue is more properly characterized as one of guilt - not
equal information - thus the law accomplishes little by setting one
criminal free simply because another one knows more about criminal
procedure. 1°2 In other words, conviction should depend on factual guilt
rather than a suspect's awareness of his constitutional rights. Police
failure to issue Miranda warnings does not convert a suspect's guilt
to innocencelce
Others have argued that the exception prevents the anomaly of
penalizing officers who act to protect public safety. ° Requiring man-
datory warnings in exigent circumstances would lead to nonresponsive
suspects and continuing danger. 105 Allowing officers to forego warnings
increases their ability to obtain information necessary to defuse a
volatile situation.
C. The Fourth Amendment Analogy
Proponents also have relied on the fourth amendment to justify
the public safety exception.106 The fourth amendment guarantees "[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ."7 This
guarantee is not absolute, however, as the Supreme Court has
fashioned exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements.
Similar exceptions could apply to the fifth amendment.
Reliance on the fourth amendment, however, is inapposite to public
safety analysis. First, the judiciary created the penalty of exclusion
under the fourth amendment; the Constitution mandated exclusion of
102. Caplan, supra note 99, at 1457 (citing Van den Haag, Comment on John Kaplan's
"Administering Capital Punishment," 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 193,199 (1984)) (guilt is personal).
103. Id.
104. Note, The Supreme Court Writes Away Rights, supra note 68, at 589-90. But see
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule incorporated to operate against states);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1913) (fourth amendment mandates penalty of
exclusion in federal courts). For a discussion of the history of the exclusionary rule, see Baldwin,
Due Process and the Exclusionary Rule: Integrity and Justification, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 505
(1987).
105. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657; see Note, The Supreme Court Writes Away Rights, supra
note 68, at 585.
106. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (official's good faith belief in probable
cause can save otherwise defective warrant); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (fireman
can enter burning building without warrant); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may stop
and frisk suspect without arrest to prevent crime and secure officer's protection).
107. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The modern understanding of the fourth amendment is that
"wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,'. . . he is entitled to
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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compelled testimony under the fifth amendment.'08 Second, the fourth
amendment encompasses tangible evidence whereas the fifth amend-
ment addresses less reliable intangible evidence.1°9 Finally, the fourth
amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches and seizures."10
Reasonableness does not factor into the fifth amendment's prohibition
of compelled self-incrimination."'
Although fourth amendment concerns do not survive fifth amend-
ment analysis, the realities of spontaneous decisionmaking blur the
importance of Miranda even without the public safety exception.
Under exigent circumstances, officers will inevitably, almost reflex-
ively, ask impulsive questions such as the location of a weapon."2
They will ask these questions either as an instinctive act of self-pre-
servation,13 or as a result of a good faith belief that they are entitled
to disregard "legalism" under the circumstances.14 Arguably, there-
fore, the public safety exception merely articulates the implicit de-
mands of on-the-scene police decisionmaking. When a suspect threatens
or might threaten the public safety, the need for admonitions fades. 15
However, the impracticality of Miranda under exigent circumstances
does not necessarily demand admission of unwarned statements. 116 The
threat of exclusion will not deter instinctive inquiries motivated by
108. Note, The Supreme Court Writes Away Rights, supra note 68, at 589-90; see also
Weeks, 2.32 U.S. at 393 (fourth amendment mandates penalty of exclusion in federal courts).
109. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 666-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761-65 (1966) (fifth amendment
bars state from compelling testimonial or communicative evidence)); see Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (fifth amendment does not bar compelled evidence if non-testimonial);
see also Note, The Suprene Court Writes Away Rights, supra note 68, at 590 (compelled
testimony inherently unreliable).
110. See supra note 107.
111. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408.
112. Recent Decisions, New York v. Quarles: The "Public Safety" Exception to Miranda,
26 ARiz. L. REv. 967, 972; cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) ("[I]n dealing with the
rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an
escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they
possess.").
113. From the police perspective, arrest does not necessarily end the criminal episode. See
Pizzi, supra note 61, at 579.
114. See Goldberg, supra note 79.
115. People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 882, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (1974).
116. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Miranda does not prohibit
emergency questioning, but fifth amendment bars introduction of compelled testimony from
trial). Because a fifth amendment violation occurs in the courtroom rather than the street,
Justice Marshall saw no conflict between an officer's need to defuse a situation and a defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
19881
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self-preservation. Accordingly, courts need not admit improperly ob-
tained evidence to reward police officers for acting instinctively.
Excluding evidence obtained under exigent circumstances might
create additional problems. Without the exception, the suspect posing
the greatest danger also possesses the greatest odds of suppressing
incriminating statements. The possibility of exclusion may also encour-
age suspects to create their own exigencies. 111 Yet, this argument
assumes that the suspect has read New York v. Quarles. Furthermore,
it erroneously assumes that the suspect can induce police to ask ques-
tions without Miranda warnings. But even without that argument,
the public may object to a legal loophole for highly dangerous suspects.
VI. QUARLES IN THE LOWER COURTS
The lower courts' Quarles decisions fall into three categories.118
First, some courts circumvent the exception by deciding the case on
other grounds. Second, some courts have attempted to limit the excep-
tion to a discernible set of circumstances. Finally, some courts simply
misapply the exception.
A. Circumventing the Exception
1. Inevitable Discovery
The lower courts have frequently circumvented the exception by
deciding Quarles-type cases on other grounds." 9 In Fiorenza v. Sulli-
117. Pizzi, supra note 61, at 597-98.
118. But see supra note 10.
119. For example, in Edwards v. State, 515 So. 2d 86 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals circumvented the exception while citing Quarles to bolster an other-
wise questionable finding of no interrogation. The court held that an inquiry about the location
of the gun did not constitute interrogation because the officer did not direct his inquiry to
appellant. Id. at 90-91. If the officer had directed his question to appellant, however, then the
court would have applied Quarles. Id. at 91.
The court's distinction between inquiries directed to suspects and those that suspects merely
overhear could impair the existing notion of interrogation. This approach by the Edwards court
leads to the following rule of law: If an officer knows that appellant might overhear a question,
then the question constitutes interrogation under Innis. Suppression hearings would then become
inquiries into the subjective motivations of officers. Courts would examine whether an officer
asked a question with the intention of the suspect overhearing it. The Supreme Court has
expressly rejected inquiries into the subjective motives of officers in both Quarles and Innis.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656 & n.6; Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
Another court used alternative grounds analysis to admit a suspect's multiple responses to
a question. DeLeon v. State, No. C14-86-930-CR (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1988) (WESTLAW,
ALLSTATES database). DeLeon, a prison inmate, was suspected of stabbing another inmate
to death. When a prison guard asked where the knives were, the suspect answered, then
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confessed. Id. at 5. The trial court suppressed DeLeon's answer as to the knives' location, but
admitted the surprise confession. Id. at 6. On appeal, the court held that because DeLeon
voluntarily made the statement regarding the location of the knives, it came under Quarles.
The subsequent confession, the court held, was not the product of interrogation. Id.
In In re A.S., 548 A.2d 202 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), a New Jersey court used
alternative grounds analysis and put a new twist on a recent Supreme Court decision. Officers
suspected A.S. of firing shots. Id. at 203. An officer chased him into his apartment building,
and ordered him to place his hands on the wall. Id. at 204. When asked what he had done with
the gun, A.S. denied having one. Id. After the officers told A.S. that another suspect had
identified him, he admitted to having the gun, told the officers where it was, then led them to
it. Id.
The trial court rejected the state's Quarles claim; the appellate court reversed. Id. at 204-06.
The court constructed a four-part alternative grounds analysis to admit the gun and the state-
ments. First, the officers questioned A.S. pursuant to a valid Terry stop. Id. at 204-05. Second,
Miranda permitted the officers' "[g]eneral on the scene questioning." Id. at 205. Third, even
if A.S. were entitled to Miranda warnings, Quarles would admit the evidence. Id.
The fourth prong of the court's analysis is the most troublesome. The court relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in E/stad to remove the 'taint" from any improperly obtained evidence.
Id. at 206. Even if the officers had obtained the gun in violation of Miranda, the New Jersey
court argued, Elstad stands for the proposition that the gun was not an inadmissible fruit of
the poisonous tree. Id. The court insisted that the officers obtained the gun not as a result of
A.S.'s telling them where it was, but rather, "by his nontestimonial conduct of leading [them]
... to the gun." Id. In conclusion, the court held that the officers did not coerce the evidence
from A.S. Id. Because Miranda is only a prophylactic rule, the uncoerced testimony did not
constitute a fifth amendment violation. Id.
The court's "shotgun" approach to admitting evidence obtained in the absence of Miranda
warnings were clearly result oriented. The "Terry stop" was not a pat-down search, but a full-
fledged custodial interrogation. When the pat-down produced no evidence, the officers resorted
to questioning the suspect. Id. at 204. Unsatisfied with his initial response, officers informed
him that they had evidence that refuted his on-the-street testimony. Id. If Terry and its progeny
actually legitimized this type of evidence-gathering, then this "reasonable" exception to the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule can swallow the fifth amendment privilege.
The court's second assertion, that Miranda did not require the officers to warn A.S., was
questionable as well. The line Miranda drew between on-the-scene factfinding and custodial
interrogation is presumptively suspect-oriented. The officers knew what had happened. They
had neutralized their suspect. With his hands against the wall, A.S. was not free to leave,
therefore he was in custody. Further, the officers never asked A.S. whether he had a gun. See
id. Instead, they asked him where it was, then advised him that a witness had identified him
as possessing the gun. Id. This line of questioning was reasonably calculated to elicit incriminating
evidence, thus the officers had subjected A.S. to interrogation. In fact, it is difficult to imagine
any official motive the police may have had if not to gather evidence of a crime.
The officers might have acted out of concern for the public safety. Ironically, the exception
provided the strongest basis available to admit the evidence. Despite the confusion surrounding
Quarles, one required element of the exception is clear: missing guns threaten the public safety.
The only deficiency in A.S. from a Quarles perspective is that the officers' questions might
have exceeded the bare minimum necessary to defuse the danger. The court's discussion of
Quarles was brief, however. See id. at 205-06. The court apparently had little confidence in the
exception, as evidenced by the amalgamation of legal arguments offered to bolster Quarles. See
id. at 204-06.
Although A.S. was a strong Quarles case, the court's interpretation of Elstad undermined
whatever strength that might have flowed from the public safety exception. The Elstad Court
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van,120 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York reviewed the murder conviction of a man who shot his
employer. When police arrived at the Fiorenza shooting, a witness
told an officer that the killer remained at the scene.12' With his gun
drawn, the officer asked two men standing over the body, "What
happened?" "I shot him," one responded. "You did what?" "I shot
him."'12 The officer then asked where the gun was. The suspect pointed
to a nearby bench.m The officer recovered the gun, handcuffed the
suspect, and placed him in the police car.' 4
After considering Quarles, the court decided the case on other
grounds. 28 The trial court found no custodial interrogation because
the officer's questions were "virtually the first words out of his
mouth."' Absent custodial interrogation, Miranda did not apply. On
appeal, the court found custody but no interrogation,m holding that
Miranda permitted the initial question - "What happened?" - as a
general on-the-scene question.1 The court thus recognized that
Miranda does not require police officers to administer warnings to
everyone they question.m Fiorenza would permit unwarned, spontane-
ous questions prompted by necessity of the circumstances, because
these questions are presumptively not tailored to elicit incriminating
refused to exclude a second confession, preceded by Miranda warnings and a valid waiver, as
the "fruit" of an earlier Miranda violation. E/stad, 470 U.S. at 318. Elstad was clearly inapplic-
able to A.S. The distinction between the two cases is blaring In Elstad, the suspect received
Miranda warnings before his second confession, whereas A.S. never received any warnings at
all. Additionally, the A.S. court's distinction between telling officers about the location of a gun
and taking them to the gun is specious. The court's reasoning is reduceable to the following
assertion: Had A.S. only told the officers the precise location of the gun, but refused to take
them there, then the gun would have been an illegally obtained 'Truit." This result oriented
interpretation of the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine not only contorts Elstad, but it makes
no sense.
For another alternative grounds case, see Commonwealth v. Logan, No. 106 E.D. 1982 (Pa.
Oct. 18, 1988) (WESTLAW, OH-CA database) (Quarles available when suspect axed stranger
to death on public bus, but court relied on fact that no interrogation occurred).
120. No. 85 Civ. 0592 (LPG) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985) (WESTLAW, DCTU database).
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 17.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 15-16. The Court used the Innis definition of interrogation. See supra notes
17-19 and accompanying text.
128. Fiorenza, No. 85 Civ. 0592 (LPG) at 16.
129. Id.; see Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 711, 714 (1976).
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responses. Although the officer could not foresee Fiorenza's incriminat-
ing response to his initial question, 13° the court found that the sub-
sequent question about the location of the gun constituted custodial
interrogation and did not satisfy the requirements of Quarles.131
Nevertheless, the court admitted the handgun under the "inevitable
discovery" doctrine.1m
By relying on the inevitable discovery doctrine rather than the
public safety exception, the Fiorenza court demonstrated the legal
options available to courts interpreting the exception. Without the
inevitable discovery doctrine, the court probably would have suppres-
sed the gun as a "fruit" of improper questioning. However, Quarles
and other recent decisionsm have vitiated the "fruits of the poisonous
tree" doctrine.13 As a result, Quarles, inevitable discovery, and harm-
less error3 - furnish ambitious prosecutors with a menu of unclear
exceptions that admit evidence that would otherwise be considered
illegally obtained.
130. Fiorenza, No. 85 Civ. 0592 (LPG) at 16.
131. Id. at 17. This is a curious finding. It is difficult to factually distinguish Fiorenza from
Quarles.
132. Id. (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)). The "inevitable discovery" doctrine
removes the taint from any evidence that the Government would have discovered by constitu-
tional means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447-50 (1984). The Court upheld Iowa's contention
that if police had not illegally induced Wlliams to lead them to his murder victim, police would
inevitably have discovered the body in essentially the same condition that they found it. Id. at
449-50. Under federal constitutional analysis, the inevitable discovery doctrine requires proof
by a preponderance of the evidence that the Government would have discovered the evidence,
absent the illegality, by proper and predictable investigatory procedures. See, e.g., United
States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1983) (must be certain that evidence would be found
- not enough that lawful means of acquiring the evidence existed); United States v. Romero,
69-2 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982) (warning against resort to speculation). Justices Brennan and
Stevens, however, read Williams narrowly. In his dissent, Justice Brennan insisted that the
doctrine requires clear and convincing proof rather than the preponderance standard suggested
in Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion. Nix, 467 U.S. at 459-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens echoed Justice Brennan's belief that the doctrine
applies only to investigations already in process when the constitutional violation occurred. Id.
at 456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 31.
135. Harmless error is "the notion that a criminal conviction need not be reversed even
though mistakes of law or procedure were admittedly made at the trial." Allen, A Serendipitous
Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in the Courts of Review, 70 IowA
L. REV. 311, 329 (1984). Modern interest in the practice is on trial errors that violated a
defendant's constitutional rights. Id.; see United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983); Harring-
ton v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (sixth amendment); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)
(fifth amendment); Malinsd v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (fourteenth amendment). Professor
Allen joins others in questioning the logic of harmless error. E.g., Goldberg, Harmless Error:
A Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980); Saltzburg, The
Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973).
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2. The Fourth Amendment and AIDS
In Barlow v. Superior Court,1" the California Fourth District Court
of Appeal openly circumvented the exception. 137 Petitioner Barlow was
marching in a Gay Pride Parade when he scuffled with police. 1 Barlow
bit one officer on the shoulder and another on the knuckle.139 Both
bites punctured the skin and drew blood. 4o Police arrested Barlow,
and took him to the hospital to treat his injuries.'14 Without issuing
Miranda warnings, an officer then asked Barlow whether he was a
homosexual with AIDS.'4 He replied that he was a homosexual and
that "you better take it that I do have AIDS for the officer's sake."'
Police then took Barlow to the stationhouse where, without a warrant
and against his will, they took blood samples for AIDS analysis.'4 In
defense of the police action, the People argued that the blood samples
were necessary to prove Barlow's intent to kill or seriously harm the
officers by passing the AIDS virus through the bite wound. 145
The court discussed Quarles but declined to determine whether
the public safety exception applied to a suspected AIDS carrier who
bites another person.1 46 Instead, the court decided the case on fourth
amendment grounds.147 According to the court, the police lacked prob-
able cause to believe that the blood tests would reveal Barlow's intent
to kill the officers.'4 In reaching that holding, the court engaged in
a complicated discussion of probable cause, causation, intent, privacy,
and several provisions of the California Administrative Code. 49 The
court apparently preferred fourth amendment grounds to deciding
whether AIDS carriers threaten public safety under Quarles.
The court's choice to circumvent Quarles is understandable. Al-
though AIDS creates a present danger to the safety of officers and
136. 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Ct. App. 1987).
137. Id. at 136.
138. Id. at 135.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. Barlow had sustained unspecified injuries in his scuffle with police. He was charged
with two counts of battery against a police officer and one count of resisting arrest. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 136.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 137-40.
148. Id. at 137. The opinion does not address whether the officers actually contracted AIDS.
149. Id. at 136-40.
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the public, is it sufficient to trigger Quarles?W The need for answers
in Barlow was not as urgent as Quarles requires. The officers in
Barlow, personally suspicious that Barlow had AIDS, could have found
the answers by submitting themselves to testing. But without the
prompt results of Barlow's tests, the officers would face a nine-month
period of uncertainty while waiting for their own AIDS test results.'r-
In spite of that potentially traumatic waiting period, the possibility
of infection, even with a deadly disease, does not require instinctive
action to neutralize a volatile situation under Quarles.
Barlow presented the court with the perplexing task of balancing
public safety against rights of suspected AIDS carriers. The court
openly avoided the task.'6 2 Rather than define Quarles in light of
AIDS, the court circumvented the exception and decided the case on
other grounds.53
3. No Interrogation
In State v. Ruiz, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal also
circumvented the public safety exception by finding no custodial inter-
rogation. TM In Ruiz, the defendant drove to a house where narcotics
officers were preparing to arrest the residents. ls With his gun drawn,
150. First, AIDS presents a future danger. Unlike a missing gun, an AIDS carrier might
not actually cause harm for months or even years after transmission. Second, an AIDS carrier
may engage in contact sufficient to transmit the virus, but the person whom the carrier contacts
will not necessarily contract the virus. Thus an AIDS carrier poses a more uncertain harm than
a missing gun. However, both these presumptions are rebuttable. First, the future danger of
AIDS is really a present danger with future effects. The harm associated with AIDS occurs on
transmission. An officer is justified in worrying about the ramifications of contact with an AIDS
carrier. Who would the law hold responsible if the officer then transmitted the virus to a spouse,
lover, or to another in a scuffle on the street? Disclosure of the suspected carrier's blood test
results would alert the officer whether to seek treatment or take precautions to protect others.
Second, the uncertainty of transmission does not mitigate the potential danger of an AIDS
carrier. Even a missing gun does not harm everyone who finds it. An accomplice who finds a
missing weapon might fail to cause harm because of poor aim, bad luck, or a change of heart.
Therefore, AIDS carriers are dangerous despite the fact that AIDS has less than a 100%
successful rate of transmission.
151. Barlow, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
152. Id. at 136. "We need not now determine whether a person suspected of harboring
the AIDS virus who bites another poses such a threat to the public safety that his or her
un-Mirandized statement may be considered in the issuance of a search warrant." Id.
153. Id. "[With or without Barlow's statement, the warrant was issued without probable
cause." Id.
154. 526 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1988).
155. Id. at 171.
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an officer ordered Ruiz to get out of the car and to lie on the ground.'
Without warnings, the police asked Ruiz whether he had a gun. 1 7
Ruiz admitted to having a pistol beneath the car's seat.'6 The officer
retrieved the pistol, then arrested Ruiz for carrying a concealed fire-
arm. 59 After receiving Miranda warnings, Ruiz confessed to his in-
volvement in the drug transaction and told officers his car contained
contraband. 16
The trial court suppressed both the gun and the contraband because
Ruiz was under the functional equivalent of arrest when asked about
the gun.16' The appellate court reversed.1ca Although the State raised
the public safety exception at trial, the appellate court expressly cir-
cumvented Quarles.'63 Instead, the court used fourth amendment doc-
trine to admit both the tangible and testimonial evidence.16
Relying on Terry v. Ohio,'6 the court held that the police had not
subjected Ruiz to custodial interrogation, but instead had questioned
him pursuant to a valid Terry stop.16 The court assembled cases from
various jurisdictions that collectively hold that an officer who draws
his gun, handcuffs a suspect, or forces a suspect to lie face down on
the ground has not made a custodial arrest.' Because Ruiz's presence
at the scene of the drug transaction gave police a founded suspicion
of his involvement in criminal activity, the court held that Terry per-
mitted the stop, the inquiry, and the seizure of both the gun and
contraband. 16
If a founded suspicion justifies a Terry stop and frisk, the Ruiz
court reasoned, then Terry also allows a "less intrusive" oral inquiry. 69
156. Id. The officer told Ruiz to remain on the ground until police ascertained who the
actual suspects were. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Officers retrieved cocaine and contraband from Ruiz's car. Id.
161. Id. As a result, Miranda warnings were required before police could interrogate the
suspect. Id.
162. Id. at 171-72.
163. Id. at 172 n.3.
164. Id. at 172-73. The propriety of gaining testimonial evidence via the fourth amendment
is dubious. See infra notes 180 & 276.
165. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see infra notes 239 & 282-83.
166. Ruiz, 526 So. 2d at 172.
167. Id. The court disputed the relevance of whether police had probable cause to arrest
Ruiz. Id. at 172 n.3.
168. Id. at 172-73.
169. Id. at 173; see infra note 276.
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To hold otherwise would unreasonably extend Miranda.170 Instead,
the court chose to narrow Miranda, extend Terry, and sidestep
Quarles.'17 The court also implied that a lawful automobile search
would have validated the otherwise improperly obtained evidence,
thus implicitly applying the inevitable discovery doctrine. 1' 2
The court's circumvention confounded the Miranda definition of
custodial interrogation. 173 Gunpoint interrogation of a suspect while
forcing him to lie face down on the street significantly restricts the
suspect's freedom and is reasonably calculated to elicit an incriminating
response. 174 Although the court cited several cases to support its hold-
ing that Ruiz was not under custodial interrogation, none featured
police asking a suspect about possession of a gun. 17 To admit this
inquiry and its fruits, the court maintained that an inquiry is less
intrusive than a pat-down search. 76
This argument is specious-foreign to both fourth and fifth amend-
ment jurisprudence. Because the fourth amendment's standard of
"reasonableness" does not modify the fifth amendment's constitution-
ally mandated exclusion of coerced self incrimination, the Constitution
betrays a heightened interest in penalizing fifth amendment viola-
tions.177 Furthermore, Ruiz aptly illustrates the intrusiveness of illegal
inquiries. But for the officer's question, a Terry search would have
yielded no evidence. Investigative techniques, rather than unwarned
custodial interrogation, would have been necessary to incriminate
Ruiz. 178
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal avoided the potential
obstacle of Quarles through a narrow interpretation of Miranda that
characterized Ruiz as outside the fifth amendment. 179 The court ex-
170. Ruiz, 526 So. 2d at 173.
171. The court touched on Terry stops and automobile searches under the fourth amendment,
Miranda requirements under the fifth amendment, and the Quarles exception. See id. at 172-73.
It also echoed the Supreme Court's recent "discovery" that Miranda is not constitutionally
required. Id. at 173 n.5.
172. Id. The court mentioned the availability of a constitutional vehicle search, but did not
mention the inevitable discovery doctrine by name. Id.; see supra note 132.
173. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 649, 656 & n.6; Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980);
see supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
175. Ruiz, 526 So. 2d at 172.
176. Id. at 173.
177. See text accompanying notes 106-11.
178. After all, confessions are not the only means to conviction.
179. Ruiz, 526 So. 2d at 172 & n.3. Few citizens would consider lying face down on the
street at gunpoint while being questioned by police as anything but custodial interrogation.
Despite the court's holding, this case clearly involved both custodial interrogation and compelled
self-incrimination.
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panded the scope of a Terry stop by adding Quarles-type questions
about the location of weapons. 11 The court's confusion over the fifth
amendment was most obvious when it asserted that even with warn-
ings the evidence might have been suppressed if Ruiz was in custody.,dl
In fact, Miranda holds just the opposite; Miranda presumes coercion
only in the absence of warnings.12
Had the court not circumvented the exception, Quarles might have
saved the incriminating statements from exclusion. Under Quarles,
the state could have ignored the officer's failure to issue warnings if
it could have linked his omission to the preservation of public safety.
If Quarles is to have any utility, then Ruiz ought to have been a
public safety prototype. Officers were preparing to make a dangerous
arrest. 1' Ruiz's arrival made him a logical suspect. To preserve both
the arrest and officer safety, police neutralized all suspects. But rather
than invoke the public safety exception to admit the evidence derived
from unwarned inquiries, the court mistakenly asserted that Quarles
"might not" save it from exclusion.'s
The societal cost of excluding unwarned evidence at trial may con-
tribute to the lower courts' reluctance to define the scope of the excep-
tion. If the scope remains unclear, courts may invoke Quarles simply
to admit evidence that arguably was improperly obtained. The prosecu-
tion may join the exception with claims of no custody, no interrogation,
inevitable discovery, or harmless error, offering a court several
grounds to admit statements obtained from unwarned statements. If
courts recognize several alternative grounds on which to admit the
same evidence, the strength of each individual ground weakens. Al-
180. Id. at 172-73. Terry inspired some thoughtful scholarship. For a thorough analysis of
the Terry line of cases, see LaFave, supra note 16. Professor LaFave only briefly recognized
the potential danger of the intersection of Miranda and Terry:
[T]he only distinction to be made is between those instances in which a general
inquiry (for example, "What happened?") is made to witnesses, and those in which
an individual is called on to inculpate or exculpate himself (for example, "What
are you doing here?" or "Where did you get that property?'). In the latter instances
the warnings should be required whether or not there is "custody," a "seizure,"
or an "arrest." (citations omitted).
Id. at 100; see infra note 276; cf. Miranda Rights in a Terry Stop: The Implications of People
v. Johnson, 63 DEN. U.L. REv. 109 (1985) (there is a pronounced distinction between Miranda
and Terry).
181. Ruiz, 526 So. 2d at 172 n.3.
182. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
183. Drug sales presumptively are accompanied by weapons.
184. Ruiz, 526 So. 2d at 172 n.3.
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though courts may admit the same evidence for several different
reasons, this "shotgun" method relieves them of the pressure to clearly
define the public safety exception. The greater the uncertainty sur-
rounding the parameters of the exception, the more likely courts will
admit evidence on vaguely defined grounds of no custody, no interro-
gation, inevitable discovery, and harmless error. In hopes of attaining
a collective certainty, courts might merely lump together several un-
certain grounds.
B. Confining the Exception
1. Volatile Situations
Some courts have circumvented the exception by admitting un-
warned statements on alternative grounds. Other courts have refused
to apply Quarles in an effort to confine the exception to a discernible
set of circumstances. In In re B.R., 1' a handgun was missing, but
the Illinois Appellate Court refused to apply the exception. On a tip,
police sought respondent, a fifteen year old youth who allegedly knew
of a shooting and the whereabouts of the gun.'6 Once he was inside
the police car, three officers questioned him.'8 The police told him
that they wanted to find the gun and knew he had participated in the
crime.m They added that he could only hurt himself by lying.lrs The
suspect left to find the gun, and soon returned to lead police to it. 190
He gave the names of four alleged perpetrators, but confessed his
own guilt when the police said they would question the four. 91
The trial revealed conflicting testimony as to whether the police
had threatened the suspect.' 2 However, the police admitted lying to
the suspect by saying that no serious injuries had occurred in the
shooting.9 3 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that
the police conducted a custodial interrogation.' In addition, the court
185. 133 IMl. App. 3d 946, 479 N.E.2d 1084 (App. Ct. 1985).
186. Id. at 947, 479 N.E.2d at 1085.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 948, 479 N.E.2d at 1085.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 94849, 479 N.E.2d at 1085-86. Respondent alleged that the officers gave him
a choice between 'the easy way or the hard way." Id. at 948, 479 N.E.2d at 1085. The officers
denied maldng any threats. Id., 479 N.E.2d at 1085-86.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 949, 479 N.E.2d at 1087.
1015
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emphasized that the suspect's age and fear of the police had motivated
his confession. 195 The court therefore held that the public safety excep-
tion did not apply, because the extremely exigent circumstances of
Quarles did not exist on the facts of B.R. 19 The Quarles court found
that police had a "limited time" and needed to act "instinctively.' '
But the Quarles facts make this finding questionable. The police had
already arrested and handcuffed the unarmed suspect. 19 The situation
was not urgent;'9 the choice between searching for a gun in an empty
supermarket and eliciting incriminating statements is not an instinctive
one.
The Illinois Appellate Court also distinguished Quarles on the basis
that it involved a more volatile situation than did B.R.,2 indicating
its reluctance to apply the exception. Quarles involved a future danger
that the missing weapon might accidentally injure the citizen who
found it, or that the finder might use the gun to perpetrate another
crime. B.R., on the other hand, involved an actual shooting. The police
sought both the gun and the suspect. If police did not stabilize the
situation, the suspect could create additional danger of injury. Thus,
the danger was immediate and more concrete than in Quarles. A
criminal suspect presents a greater likelihood of causing harm with a
missing handgun than does an innocent employee or customer. If the
exception applied to Quarles, it should have applied to B.R. as well.
2. Aluminum Suitcases
Less than three months after deciding B.R., the same Illinois Ap-
pellate Court again confined the exception in People v. Roundtree.20
In Roundtree, the court refused to extend the exception to questioning
about the ownership of an aluminum suitcase.2 Defendant drove into
the back of a police car on the shoulder of the interstate.2 Exiting
195. Id. at 949-50, 479 N.E.2d at 1086.
196. Id. at 950, 479 N.E.2d at 1087.
197. Id. The court stated that in Quarles "police had... 'imited time' to act instinctively
to neutralize a 'volatile situation' and so avert immediate danger to the general public.. . ." Id.
198. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652.
199. The police faced a situation involving a missing weapon in a limited area of an empty
store late at night. In a '"imited time," the police in Quarles could have cordoned off the area,
warned store management of the problem, conducted a brief search, and found the gun. See
supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
200. B.R., 133 IM. App. 3d at 950, 479 N.E.2d at 1087.
201. 135 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 482 N.E.2d 693 (App. Ct. 1985).
202. Id. at 1080, 482 N.E.2d at 697-98.
203. Id. at 1077, 482 N.E.2d at 696.
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his car, the officer heard a shot and saw two men struggling over a
gun in their front seat. 24 When police back-up arrived, the officers
searched and handcuffed the suspects and took the gun. One officer
then found an aluminum suitcase on the back seat of the car. Before
issuing warnings, the police asked who owned the suitcase.m The
defendant claimed ownership.m The police opened the suitcase and
found cocaine and drug paraphernalia.2
The appellate court reversed the trial court's finding of no custody,
and rejected the State's Quarles argument. 210  The officers had
stabilized the situation by handcuffing the suspects and positioning
them away from the car before questioning them.211 Further, the re-
cord did not establish that the suitcase posed a threat, real or imagi-
nary, to the public safety.2 2
In effect, the appellate court distinguished the public safety impli-
cations of an aluminum suitcase from those of a gun. To apply the
public safety exception to the Roundtree facts would convert the "pub-
lic safety" exception to the "officer curiosity" exception. Unless the
officers suspected that the suitcase contained a bomb, they had no
reason to perceive a threat to the public safety. The Illinois Appellate
Court reasoned that the absence of the requisite threat justified a
limiting interpretation of Quarles.213
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1077-78, 482 N.E.2d at 696.
210. Id. at 1079-80, 482 N.E.2d at 697-98.
211. Id. at 1080, 482 N.E.2d at 697-98.
212. Id., 482 N.E.2d at 698.
213. Although the Court did not discuss the inevitable discovery doctrine, the officers could
have found the evidence through a valid fourth amendment search. See supra note 132. The
Supreme Court has held that when conducting warrantless searches incident to arrest, officers
may search an arrestee and the area immediately within the arrestee's reach. Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Court reasoned that the search was justified by the need to
prevent an arrestee from gaining possession of a weapon or destroying evidence. Id. at 762-63.
Twelve years later, the Court extended Chimel to an automobile search where officers searched
the automobile after the arrestees were no longer in it. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981). Finally, in 1983, the Court held that if a suspect is not under arrest, officers may still
search the passenger compartment of a car if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect
is armed or dangerous. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Therefore, the police in Round-
tree possessed constitutional means of seizing the suitcase.
The prosecution may have avoided the inevitable discovery doctrine for two reasons. First,
Nix v. Williams was a sixth amendment case. Nix v. Wiffliams 467 U.S. 431 (1984). While the
rationale may apply to the fourth and fifth amendments as well, reviewing courts may choose
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3. Missing Weapons
In another effort to confine the exception, the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court refused to extend Quarles to the
unwarned confession of an eleven-year-old to a fatal shooting. In In
re John C.,214 a youth led police to a bedroom where his friend lay
dead on the floor.21 r5 A woman then brought in her son, the appellant.
When an officer asked him if he had shot the victim, he answered
'"yes. '216 The officer then asked why, and where the gun was.21 7 Appel-
lant claimed that the shooting was accidental and that he did not have
the weapon. 218 On continued questioning, appellant said that he left
the gun with a friend across the street.21 9 Roughly half of the fourteen
officers present questioned appellant for nearly an hour before taking
him to the stationhouse and issuing Miranda warnings.220
At the suppression hearing, the court considered the various state-
ments separately.221 The court suppressed the questions about why
appellant shot the victim and gave the weapon to a friend because
the circumstances in which the questions were asked constituted cus-
todial interrogation and did not concern a threat to public safety.2 2
In addition, the police asked 'There is the gun?" during custodial
interrogation, but the trial court admitted the response under
Quarles.- On appeal, however, the court did not find an "immediate
volatile situation" sufficient to trigger the exception,22 reasoning that
although missing guns endanger the public, it was unwilling to allow
every inquiry over the location of a weapon to fall within the excep-
tion.225 The exception would swallow the rule unless Quarles were
more narrowly construed.m
to limit Nix to sixth amendment situations. More likely, however, is that Nix involved a search
already underway. Id. at 449. Therefore, courts might adhere to the advice of Justices Brennan
and Stevens and limit Nix to cases in which the State has already initiated a valid, constitutional
means of obtaining the evidence. See supm note 132.
214. 130 A.D.2d 246, 519 N.Y.S.2d 223 (App. Div. 1987).
215. Id. at 247, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
216. Id. at 247-48, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
217. Id. at 248, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 248, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 225. Appellant's aunt testified that approximately eight
uniformed officers and six plainclothes detectives were in the apartment. Id.
221. Id. at 249, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 253, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
225. Id. at 252, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
226. Id.
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In narrowing Quarles, the John C. court rejected any distinction
between public and private places; the exception could apply to
either.227 The danger in a public place may be more obvious, but a
weapon in a private residence, the court reasoned, could also endanger
a number of people, including the arresting officer.228 Furthermore,
the court determined that the officer sought to elicit an admission of
guilt rather than information that would preserve the safety of others.2 29
The officer asked where the gun was only after arresting the suspect
and removing him to the living room.2 ° He interrupted the questioning
only to investigate the friend across the street.2 31 Unwarranted delay,
the suspect's youth, and the officer's improper motives placed the
John C. facts outside the ambit of Quarles.2
The court flatly rejected broad application of the exception to all
questions about the location of a weapon. Although this appears to
be a logical step in the movement to confine the exception, it removes
the only element of certainty from Quarles. Stabilizing a volatile situ-
ation begins with locating weapons. An armed perpetrator or ac-
complice probably poses the greatest danger, but if friends or family
of a victim find a weapon, they may present a threat. Finally, a
missing weapon could harm the bystander who finds it. Therefore, a
missing weapon is an important prerequisite to the exception if it is
to have any substance. Without prerequisites,2 the exception may
allow criminal trials to evolve into pro forma ratifications of prior
police interrogations.2
The John C. court also confined the public safety exception by
imposing a time restriction on police inquiries.2 According to the
John C. court, Quarles required an immediate inquiry by the police
to defuse a potential threat to public safety.3 In John C., the court
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 253, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
230. Id. at 254, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. A Minnesota court refused to automatically include missing accomplices within Quarles.
Minnesota v. Hazley, 428 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). Police asked a felony suspect who
he was and who was with him. Id. at 408. The suspect answered, then moved at trial to suppress
his answer. Id. at 410. Rejecting the State's Quarles argument, the court declared that "[missing
accomplices cannot be equated with missing guns [unless] ... the accomplice [endangers] the
public." Id. at 411.
234. Goldberg, supra note 52, at 182.
235. John C., 130 A.D.2d at 253, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
236. Id.
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objected to the "unwarranted delay" of the questioning. 2  John C.
questions the temporal scope of the State's interest in stabilizing a
volatile situation. Are all questions permitted during the emergency
period? Can the authorities intentionally prolong the interrogation to
wear down the suspect's will to resist? Even before Miranda, courts
excluded evidence obtained during extended periods of interrogation.m
Furthermore, assuming that an unwarranted delay in questioning ac-
tivates the exception, the most difficult task remains: defining "unwar-
ranted delay."m
To confine the public safety exception to a discernible set of cir-
cumstances, the Illinois Appellate Court twice declined to apply
Quarles. In B.R., the court rejected the exception when the situation
posed a greater threat to public safety than in Quarles. 0 Three months
later in Roundtree, the same court refused to extend the exception
to an automobile search following a shooting.241 The Appellate Division
237. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 220.
238. See, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1924) (defendant's
admissions made on seventh day of interrogation presumed involuntary).
239. This determination would fluctuate with individual circumstances. For example, a
hostage or hijacking scenario may warrant a greater delay than interrogation in a police-domi-
nated stationhouse. The John C. court also implied that officer safety alone may trigger the
exception. John C., 130 A.D.2d at 252, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 226. Arguably, police officers are not
members of the public while acting in their official capacity. In addition, police work is inherently
dangerous. Accepting this view, however, could make it difficult to attract individuals to police
work and would lower the morale of those now serving as police officers. The assertion that
officer safety may trigger an exception to Miranda is really nothing new. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (an officer may detain a person briefly for questioning on suspicion of involve-
ment in criminal activity). The federal courts' attempt to define the scope of Terry has led to
some inconsistent results. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (Terry permits
officer to stop to investigate past crime); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (investigative
methods employed pursuant to Terry stop should be least intrusive means reasonably available
to verify or dispel officer's suspicion of criminal activity); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972) (Terry justifies search if officer fears for his own safety); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40 (1968) (companion case to Terry with opposite result); United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162
(9th Cir. 1973) (Terry cannot be stretched to allow detective stops for generalized criminal
inquiries). Terry and other fourth amendment decisions have demonstrated that officer safety
figures in the Court's understanding of fourth amendment rights. See, e.g., Washington v.
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950). What Terry and its progeny did not resolve is whether an officer's safety
concerns should insulate the State from the penalty of exclusion for Miranda violations. Officers
would hesitate to intervene if faced with the threat of exclusion every time they acted to protect
themselves. On the other hand, if a situation jeopardizes an officer's safety, self-preservation
will dictate the officer's response, not concerns over exclusion of unwarned statements at trial.
240. In re B.R., 133 Il. App. 3d 946, 479 N.E.2d 1084 (App. Ct. 1985).
241. Roundtree, 135 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 482 N.E.2d 693 (App. Ct. 1985).
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of the New York Supreme Court approached the exception differently
in In re John C. by declaring that Quarles did not necessarily apply
to every inquiry about a missing gun.2 In these three decisions, the
courts found Quarles too confusing to generate an exception clear
enough to be justifiably applied.
C. Misapplying the Exception
1. Kitchen Knives
As many scholars predicted,2 some courts have simply misapplied
the exception. In People v. Cole,24 the California Court of Appeal
applied Quarles when appellant burglarized two residences and at-
tempted a kidnapping in another.2 A victim's mother told police that
appellant stole a kitchen knife from her apartment.2 6 Appellant forced
his way into a stranger's car and demanded a ride, then confessed to
the stranger, who later called the police.- 7 The police apprehended
and searched appellant, but found no weapons.m An officer asked
where the knife was.?9 Appellant replied that he had discarded it.25
On these facts, the court invoked Quarles, stating that the missing
knife posed a threat that reasonably prompted the officer's question.2 1
In his dissent, Judge White argued that the exception should be
confined "to a factual context of a firearm in places of public ...
accommodation similar to that in which the 'exception' was born."'' 2
He insisted that a lost kitchen knife did not immediately threaten the
public safety"' because such knives are readily accessible in the
home."' Furthermore, the apartment complex residents, intent on
helping police preserve evidence, would probably find the knife if the
police search failed to recover it."'
242. John C., 130 A.D.2d 246, 519 N.Y.S.2d 223 (App. Div. 1987).
243. See supra note 68.
244. 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 211 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ct. App. 1985).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 51, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
247. Id., 211 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 52, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49.
252. Id. at 58, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (White, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
254. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 58-59, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (White, J., dissenting).
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Judge White's attempt to limit the exception to public accommoda-
tions betrays a misunderstanding of Quarles analysis. He narrowed
the exception to cover only particular types of exigent circumstances
while maintaining broad protection of the fifth amendment. While
Judge White's exigent circumstances may appear to be a necessary
reaction to a potentially overbroad exception, the Quarles facts were
too narrow, and the danger too remote, to serve as a meaningful
standard for the exception. By limiting the exception to Quarles-type
situations, Judge White ignored other factual scenarios that endanger
the public safety: kidnappings, prison takeovers, airline hijackings,
and other terrorist acts also threaten public safety without necessarily
involving a missing weapon in a public place.
Moreover, other items pose a public danger equal to that posed
by a gun. Judge White's argument rests on the ready availability of
kitchen knives and the willingness of law-abiding citizens to help police
solve crimes. However, ease of access does not distinguish knives
from guns. Rather, guns inherently pose a greater danger than knives
of causing accidental or intentional harm. Although a gun poses less
danger than a bomb, guns frequently cause accidental injuries and
fatalities. On a comparative scale of danger, how would Judge White
treat a stash of cocaine? His definition of the exception excludes the
potential danger to those who find drugs.
The dissent properly excluded knives from the ambit of the excep-
tion, but for the wrong reasons. Stabbings and other assaults do no
often occur accidentally, nor do they often involve instruments found
in public places. The real threat of a gun, then, is its potential for
spontaneous danger.2 But because Judge White's analysis failed to
encompass other types of equal threats, it followed a meaningless
distinction.
Judge White also adhered to the hollow distinction between public
and private places. As the John C. court pointed out,257 a weapon in
or around a private residence threatens a number of people. Citizens
at risk are no less members of the public simply because they have
left a hotel, restaurant, or baseball game. The public safety exception
should protect the public everywhere. So, while Judge White justifi-
ably sought to avoid absurd extensions of the Quarles rationale, his
suggestions ineffectively redefined Quarles.
256. In the hands of the extremely young, naive, or curious, drugs, too, pose a danger.
Drugs create a more limited potential danger than firearms, as drugs harm only the user. But
drugs may conceivably cause both emotional and financial harm to the families of users, in
addition to the bodily harm that a user might cause an unsuspecting citizen on the street when
the user seeks a "fix."
257. In re John C., 130 A.D.2d 246, 252, 519 N.Y.S.2d 223, 227 (App. Div. 1987).
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2. Rough Neighborhoods
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also misapplied the public
safety exception in United States v. Brady.2 In Brady, a woman left
a car and ran toward police. 59 Suspecting Brady of battery, the officer
drew his gun, ordered Brady out of the car, and frisked him.5 Brady
responded ambiguously to the officer's request to search the car.21
Asked if he had a gun in the car, Brady said that he had one in the
trunk. 12 A search of the trunk also revealed contraband.m Because
of conflicting testimony on the issue of custodial interrogation, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed that issue de novo.264 The court determined
that the officer's questioning of Brady was custodial interrogation, but
upheld the lower court's admission of both the physical evidence and
statements under Quarles.5 The dangerous crowd that had gathered
at dusk in the rough neighborhood, the suspect's open car door, and
the keys that remained in the ignition all contributed to the court's
decision.26
Although the circumstances posed potential unrest, these officers
had no reason to suspect that Brady disposed of a weapon where it
immediately endangered the public.267 No one had said that Brady had
a weapon, and unlike Quarles, he did not wear a shoulder holster.26
The exchange between Brady and the officer surpassed the mere
"Where's the gun?" inquiry of Quarles. The officer asked more than
one question and attempted to obtain Brady's consent to search the
258. 819 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1032 (1988).
259. Id. at 885.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. Police frequently rely on consent searches because they involve no paper work
and offer an opportunity to search even when probable cause is lacking. KAMIsAR, supra note
27, at 408-22. The definition of "consent" is a sticky one. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973), the Court held that consent must be voluntarily given, and not the result of
duress or coercion, express or implied. The prosecution, however, is not required to demonstrate
a suspect's knowledge of a right to refuse the request to search. Id. at 220.
263. Brady, 819 F.2d at 885-86. The officer "found a revolver, two speed loaders, ammun-
ition, seal bombs, an electronic scale, a bag of what appeared to be metamphetamine, and a
powder that appeared to be a cutting agent." Id.
264. Id. at 886. The three witnesses at the suppression hearing gave different accounts of
the conversation between police and Brady. Id. at 886 n.1.
265. Id. at 887-88. The court held that the officer properly inquired about the gun to
neutralize a dangerous situation rather than elicit testimonial evidence. Id. at 888.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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trunk before Brady incriminated himself.219 Brady involved both ex-
tended questioning and a lack of concrete danger to the public, both
factors beyond the crux of Quarles analysis. The court, however,
relied on Quarles to admit both the statements and physical evi-
dence.7 0
Brady should not have fallen within the Quarles exception. The
officers could have averted the threat posed by the open door and
keys in the ignition by telling Brady to close the door and remove
the keys. After all, one officer had successfully removed Brady from
the car and detained him at gunpoint. Another officer could have
secured the car. Under Quarles, subjective evaluations such as "rough
neighborhood" should not unilaterally trigger the exception. Other-
wise, the mere occurrence of a crime at a particular street address
could activate Quarles. Not coincidentally, these "rough neighborhood"
street addresses are where most crimes and, hence, most interroga-
tions, occur.
The court also speculated on potential danger: "If Brady had a gun
in the passenger compartment of his car, a passerby or accomplice
could seize it .... [T]o neutralize this danger, [the officer] properly
asked Brady whether he had a gun."' 1 This assumption is a dark
moment in Quarles interpretation, grounded .in a series of "ifs." Com-
mon sense refutes the possibility of such a scenario. An accomplice
would concededly pose a threat, but this assumes both the existence
of a gun and an accomplice who knew of the gun. 2 The officers had
no reason, objective or subjective, to believe in either,m and thus
their actions could not have been "reasonably prompted by a concern
for the public safety."' 4
The Ninth Circuit relied on Quarles without addressing the inevi-
table discovery doctrine. However, the court rejected the prosecution's
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Accomplices should present a concrete danger to trigger the exception. Cf. supra note
233.
273. The presence of a "suspected motorcycle gang member carrying a knife among the
group of people who had gathered" did not threaten the public safety. Brady, 819 F.2d at 885.
Such an individual, if threatening at all, creates an ongoing danger. Surely the police could not
visit the suspected gang member at his home and then admit unwarned responses under the
exception. The suspect must first pose a threat. If the suspected gang member threatened
police, then one of the officers should have detained him, observed him or radioed for assistance.
A suspected gang member standing in a crowd does not ring of the exigent circumstances that
the Quarles Court envisioned when deciding to admit evidence obtained in violation of Miranda.
274. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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reliance on Michigan v. Long,-7 in which the court held that the fourth
amendment permits police to search the passenger compartment of
an automobile if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is
armed or dangerous. 6 The Brady court declined to apply Long, even
though the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the "automobile
exception" to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.m
The Court has even applied the "automobile exception" specifically
to the contents of a locked trunk.r 8 Police could have searched Brady's
trunk without relying on his incriminating statement if the officer
reasonably believed that Brady possessed a gun or other contraband. =9
Through Long, if the officer possessed such a belief, then the State
could have raised the inevitable discovery doctrine in addition to
Quarles. The Brady court, however, indicated that the officers could
not have searched the trunk until Brady made the incriminating state-
ment.2o
275. Id. at 887 n.2 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-51 (1983)); see also supra
note 213 and accompanying text.
276. Simply put, Long extended the Terry doctrine to automobiles. Long, 463 U.S. at
1049-51; see Casenote, Fourth Amendment - Officer Safety and the Protective Automobile
Search: An Expansion of the Pat-down Frisk, 74 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1265 (1983).
In a footnote, the Brady court interpreted Long to permit searches but not inquiries about
whether a suspect has a gun: "Questioning can be more intrusive than a search because it can
evoke an incriminating response in a situation where a lawful search would uncover nothing."
Brady, 819 F.2d at 887 n.2. In that footnote, however, the court ignored two important factors.
First, Long applied to passenger compartment searches, while Brady involved a more intrusive
trunk search. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-51; Brady, 819 F.2d at 888-89. Second, Long relied heavily
on the Court's reasoning in Terry which permits inquiries as well as searches and seizures if
an officer reasonably believes a suspect is connected with criminal activity. See Long, 463 U.S.
at 1049-52; United States v. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 9-10, 30 (1968); see supra note 179.
277. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981). Ross, however, is distinguishable from Brady. In
Ross, police had probable cause to search the trunk for narcotics. Ross, 456 U.S. at 824-25.
The controversy was over a warrantless search of a container found in the trunk. Id. at 798-99.
In Brady, however, the only basis of belief that Brady kept contraband in his trunk was Brady's
answer to an unwarned inquiry. Brady, 819 F.2d at 888.
278. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Cady, however, may be more limited than
this. Cady involved a warrantless search of an auto towed to a private garage even though no
probable cause existed to believe that the vehicle contained fruits of a crime. Id. at 436-37. The
sole justification of this search was that it was incident to the caretaking function of the police
to protect the community. Id. at 443. The police believed that the incapacitated driver, a police
officer, had a weapon in the car that might be discovered by vandals. Id. at 437.
279. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), permits searches incident to a lawful arrest.
Belton, however, involved a passenger compartment search and did not extend to the trunk.
Id. at 462-63.
280. See Brady, 819 F.2d at 887 n.2. The court erected a combination of doctrines on which
to hoist Brady. In order to establish probable cause under Ross, the court upheld the prosecu-
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If the Ninth Circuit correctly read Michigan v. Long,281 then the
inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to Brady. But in its
analysis, the court raised an interesting distinction between the fourth
and fifth amendments. In effect, the court reduced the definition of
a search to a physical process, not involving questioning. Once an
officer adds inquiries to an otherwise valid search, the officer must
first issue warnings in order to avoid fifth amendment exclusion of
the subsequent incriminating statements and evidence produced as
"fruits" of the statements. Although the Brady court's theory appar-
ently limits police behavior, Terry v. Ohiom had already decided this
issue in favor of the police in 1968. Whether the inevitable discovery
doctrine applies to Brady depends on the scope of inquiries permissible
under Terry, which are still unclear twenty years later. Yet, the State
presumably should not be able to use a fourth amendment search to
obtain testimonial evidence. A broad reading of Terry allows such a
result.ms
3. Constitutional Violations
In State v. Kunkel,2 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals misapplied
Quarles by stretching the exception to condone a pure constitutional
violation. Police arrested Kunkel at 12:30 a.m. after suspecting him
tion's Quarles argument and admitted Brady's unwarned statement. Id. at 888-89. The court
could have achieved the same result even without Quarles if police suspected Brady was involved
in criminal activity under Terry. As a result, an officer's intuition, short of probable cause, can
provide entry into a suspect's trunk by way of self incriminating statements obtained without
the benefit of Miranda warnings. Therefore, the absence of exigent circumstances, probable
cause, or warrants to search or arrest cannot keep the police from intruding on the privacy
interest in the contents of a suspect's car trunk.
281. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
282. See 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Depending on the suspect's response and demeanor, the officer
could then make further inquiries, such as "Are you carrying any weapons?" necessary to
prevent crime or danger to the officer. This is no petty indignity, and smacks of custodial
interrogation regardless of what the Terry decision has been understood to stand for. Therefore,
if inevitable discovery is to be the State's best weapon, Terry may be the rationale that converts
the fourth amendment to a means of obtaining testimonial evidence without the benefit of
Miranda warnings.
283. See supra note 282; cf. supra note 109 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
considered a Terry stop or "stop and frisk" to be short of custodial interrogation, but referred
to the questioning that attends such a stop as "field interrogation." Id. at 7, 11, 19 n.16, 34.
Unfortunately, the Terry Court did not define the permissible scope of "pertinent questions."
Id. at 34-35. Unless courts carefully limit questioning under Terry, police may lawfully manipulate
a valid Terry stop to obtain testimonial evidence. By reducing an officer's conducting a car
search to that of a wax dummy, the Brady court offers a viable method of controlling police
manipulation of fourth amendment searches.
284. 137 Wis. 2d 172, 404 N.W.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1987).
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of harming his infant son.2 5 A detective read him his Miranda rights.2
After the detective advised him of the right to counsel,287 the detective
then advised Kunkel of the right to appointed counsel.m Although
Kunkel declined to waive his right to counsel,m9 the detective pro-
ceeded with questioning. 29° After Kunkel refused to say where his son
was, he agreed to speak with a priest.91 Several officers continued to
question Kunkel throughout the night.m  At about 7:30 a.m., Kunkel
reminded the officers of their offer to let him speak with a priest. m
Kunkel promptly confessed to the priest.2 After he confessed, the
police questioned Kunkel about his son's whereaboutsm until he led
them to his son's grave. 296
In Kunkel, police continued to question Kunkel after he claimed
his right to counsel.2 According to the Supreme Court, all questioning
must cease once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, unless the
suspect initiates the communication. 29 The right to counsel is a con-
285. Id. at 177, 404 N.W.2d at 71. The arrest warrant charged Kunkel with interference
with the parental rights of one parent by another parent. Id.
286. Id. at 178, 404 N.W.2d at 71.
287. Id., 404 N.W.2d at 72. Kunkel interjected this comment before the officer issued the
warning regarding appointed counsel. Id.
288. Id.
289. This was the court's finding. Id. at 193, 404 N.W.2d at 78. However, the State claimed
that Kunkel waived his right to counsel based on the following events:
After hearing the waiver segment, [Kunkel] said he did not wish to make a confes-
sion. Detective Quanme told [Kunkel] he did not have to confess, and that Quanme
only wanted [him] to understand his rights so that if he wanted to make a statement
he could do so. At this point, [Kunkel] signed the waiver.
Id. at 179, 404 N.W.2d at 72.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 180, 404 N.W.2d at 72.
293. Id.
294. Id. The court rejected Kunkel's contention that police obtained his confession by vio-
lating his privileged communication to his clergyman. Id. at 195, 404 N.W.2d at 78-79. The
court also rejected Kunkel's contention that because the priest served as a police agent, the
confession obtained in violation of Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona should be suppressed. Id.,
404 N.W.2d at 79. The court stated that the rescue situation allowed police to circumvent the
requirements of Miranda and Edwards. Id.
295. Id. at 180, 404 N.W.2d at 72.
296. Id. Although the facts resemble those of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the
inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable here. The officers testified that they would not have
found the grave site without Kunkel's testimony. Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d at 180-81, 404 N.W.2d
at 72-73.
297. Id. at 182-83, 404 N.W.2d at 73.
298. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); see Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91,
94-95 (1984); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
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stitutional right rather than a prophylactic rule.ma A suspect can claim
the right out of either the fifth or sixth amendment. The fifth amend-
ment right attaches when police expose a suspect to custodial interro-
gation.3° The sixth amendment right attaches after the State initiates
formal proceedings against a suspectY°1 Kunkels pre-indictment inter-
rogation therefore violated the fifth amendment right to counsel.m
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding
that Kunkel invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel when he
said that he could not afford an attorney.= Because Quarles cured
the Miranda violation, the court held that, in effect, the public safety
exception deactivated Kunkel's right to counsel.30 By applying the
exception to Kunkel, the court expanded the notion that Miranda
warnings are not constitutionally required2 ° Under Kunkel, the de-
lineation of "custodial interrogation" as the point at which the fifth
amendment right to counsel attaches is not constitutionally man-
dated.30 Therefore, the public safety exception now reaches a suspect
who has actually invoked his constitutional right to counsel. By remov-
ing the bright line activation point for the fifth amendment right to
counsel, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals granted courts the power to
balance the accused's constitutional rights against the Government's
interest in conviction, therefore resurrecting the previously unsuccess-
ful voluntariness doctrine.107
299. For a general discussion of the distinction between prophylactic rules and constitutional
requirements, see Grano, supra note 26; see also supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
300. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
301. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-06 (1964).
302. Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d 172, 177, 404 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Ct. App. 1987). Kunkel also claimed
that police denied him his sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 192, 404 N.W.2d at 78. The
court held that Kunkel's sixth amendment right to counsel attached when the judge signed his
arrest warrant. Id. at 193, 404 N.W.2d at 78. The warrant, however, was only for interference
with parental rights. Id. The first degree murder charge came two days after the interrogation
that allegedly violated Kunkel's right to counsel. Id.
303. Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d at 183, 404 N.W.2d at 74.
304. Id. Quarles, the court argued, made Miranda warnings inapplicable. Id. at 186, 404
N.W.2d at 76. Because Edwards and its waiver requirements are "an outgrowth of Miranda,"
the court rejected Kunkel's fifth amendment claim. Id. at 190-91, 404 N.W.2d at 77.
305. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444; supra notes 43-67 and accompanying text. Kunkel,
however, may well have involved the "technical" sort of Miranda violation that even Justice
Marshall understood to be encompassed by Tucker. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 684 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
306. Custodial interrogation is discussed supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
307. For a discussion of the voluntariness doctrine, see supra note 11 and accompanying
text. The Tucker majority dusted off the old voluntariness test for contemporary application.
Justice Rehnquist wrote:
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Although the Wisconsin Court of Appeals extended Quarles to
excuse a constitutional violation, Kunkel presented uniquely exigent
circumstances.3s Time played a more important role in Kunkel than
in Quarles,ms as a child's life could have depended on prompt answers
from Kunkel 10 Warnings, however, convey to the suspect the adver-
sarial nature of police conversations and thus might deprive police of
their only chance to rescue a victim if a suspect exercises the right
to silence. A per se ban of all unwarned evidence could therefore have
a negative result. On the other hand, allowing police to choose between
warnings and investigation would unnecessarily expand police discre-
tion. Police interested in convictions might hesitate to act in a crisis
situation. In many cases, however, the prosecution may not need a
confession to obtain a conviction. The State would therefore lose noth-
ing through exclusion.311 By applying Quarles to Kunkel, the Wisconsin
A comparison of the facts in this case with the historical circumstances underlying
the privilege against compulsory self incrimination strongly indicates that the police
conduct here did not deprive [Tucker] of his privilege against compulsory self
incrimination as such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure
of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda. Certainly no
one could contend that the interrogation... bore any resemblance to the historical
practices at which the right against compulsory self incrimination was aimed ....
[H]is statements could hardly be termed involuntary as that term has been defined
in the decisions of this Court.
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
The voluntariness doctrine was little more than an ongoing swearing contest between suspects
and the prosecution. With this in mind, the Supreme Court of Oregon expressly refused to
apply Quarles to a constitutional violation. In State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225 (1985),
the court would not "speculate about the degree of continuing vitality of Miranda v. Arizona,"
and adhered to the Supreme Court's waiver requirements articulated in Edwards. Miller, 300
Or. at 224, 709 P.2d at 241; see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Therefore, the court
refused to extend Quarles to an Edwards violation. Miller, 300 Or. at 224, 709 P.2d at 241.
308. Actually, Kunkel was not a pure Quarles case. Rather, the court viewed Quarles as
a means to uphold California's "rescue doctrine" as an exception to Miranda requirements.
Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d at 186, 404 N.W.2d at 75. The "rescue doctrine" disposes of Miranda when
"life hangs in the balance." Id. at 185, 404 N.W.2d at 75. The doctrine requires that police act
to save human life, that no other action promises relief, and that the interrogators are motivated
primarily by rescue. Id. at 186-90, 404 N.W.2d at 74-75.
309. Id. at 188, 404 N.W.2d at 76. The court, however, stated that police faced a "more
calm and clear picture" than in Quarles. Id. Still, the court held that the police acted reasonably.
Id.
310. Id.
311. Justice Marshall made this very point in his Quarles dissent:
I also seriously question how often a statement linking a suspect to the threat to
the public ends up being the crucial and otherwise unprovable element of a criminal
prosecution . . . . Only because the State dropped the rape count and chose to
proceed to trial solely on the criminal-possession charge did respondent's answer
to Officer Kraft's question become critical.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 687 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Court of Appeals established a per se rule of admissibility. Although
this approach maximizes both the safety of victims and the number
of convictions at trial, it fails to deter objectionable police conduct.3 12
The Kunkel court did not foresee police abuse of the exception.
Police knew that a nine-month old child was missing for seventeen
hours, but still they questioned Kunkel for over seven hours before
obtaining a confession. The court did not indicate how long the inter-
rogation could have continued without an attorney present. Moreover,
the court refused to delineate the boundaries of acceptable interroga-
tion practices when the State's interest in rescue exceeds a suspect's
constitutional protection. By avoiding these questions, the court sent
confessions law back to the pre-Miranda era when a defendant's rights
fluctuated from case to case, depending in part on the State's desire
to obtain a conviction.
The lower courts have misapplied Quarles to situations that pose
no threat to the public safety, even to the "dangers" posed by a
missing kitchen knife313 and a "dangerous crowd" in a "rough neighbor-
hood. 3 14 When a criminal suspect actually threatened the public safety,
at least one court was willing to extend Quarles to excuse a pure
constitutional violation.31 5 Without clear boundaries for the exception,
courts may continue to use Quarles as a pretext for admitting other-
wise improperly obtained evidence.
VII. A CALL FOR CONSISTENCY
For better or for worse, Quarles is now the law.316 Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion optimistically trusted police officers to apply
the exception instinctively. As a result, reviewing courts have de-
veloped their own notions of "public safety." Assuming that the excep-
312. Somewhat ironically, the Kunkel court claimed that the rescue doctrine was a "limited
exception" to Miranda. The court, however, failed to define the limits. Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d at
189, 404 N.W.2d at 76.
313. People v. Cole, 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 211 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ct. App. 1985); see supra
notes 244-56 and accompanying text.
314. United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1032
(1988); see supra notes 258-83 and accompanying text.
315. Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d at 172, 404 N.W.2d at 69; see supra notes 284-312 and accompany-
ing text. One court invoked Quarles when police had used blatant trickery to induce a drunk,
unsophisticated suspect to incriminate himself. See People v. Gilliard, 189 Cal. App. 3d 285,
234 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct. App. 1987) (defendant claimed that officer tricked him into answering
question by telling defendant that public drunkenness was only charge against him).
316. Justice O'Connor said the same thing about Miranda. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 664
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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tion remains good law, judicial consistency requires a clear set of
standards.
One approach to redefining Quarles would distinguish questions
that seek an admission of guilt from those that seek to preserve the
public safety.3 17 Under this approach, courts would permit no more
than the bare minumum questioning of a suspect.3 18 Superfluous ques-
tions undermine the "good faith" aspect of questioning. For example,
the following exchange might occur between police and an unwarned
suspect:
1. "What happened?" "Someone was shot."
2. "Where is the gun?" "Outside."
3. "Why are you here?" "To meet a friend."
4. "Is your friend or anyone else inside?" "No. He's across the street."
Presumably, answers one, two and four would be admissible under
Quarles. Answer three would be suppressed. Assume, arguendo, that
the prosecution depends on an accomplice's testimony. Further, as-
sume the State discovered the accomplice only through defendant's
response to questions three and four. The accomplice's testimony ar-
guably constitutes fruits of the poisonous tree.3 19
The State in this hypothetical could, however, argue that question
four would have revealed the accomplice despite question three. On
the other hand, the officers might not have asked question four if not
for the answer to question three. Excluding all evidence as impermis-
sible fruitsm because an officer asked one improper question in the
heat of the moment suggests a draconian solution to custodial interro-
gation in exigent circumstances. If one improper question taints an
otherwise legitimate series of questions, pressure to avoid a fatal slip
may deter police from defusing volatile situations.32
317. See supra text accompanying note 229; see also supra notes 70-74 and accompanying
text.
318. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 961 (10th Cir. 1987) (detective
promptly discontinued questioning once public safety was secured).
319. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Quarles, 467 U.S. at 688-90 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
320. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
321. This, in fact, is the predicament that the Quarles Court sought to avoid by establishing
the public safety exception. For officers to avoid the penalty of exclusion for improper question-
ing, they could conceivably design an addendum to the Miranda warnings composed of a laundry
list of acceptable questions, e.g., '"Where is the gun?" "Is anyone hurt?" "Is anyone inside?"
"Are you alone?" Every time an officer is in exigent circumstances, this addendum could be
recited in lieu of the standard Miranda warnings. Of course, police will not be deterred from
defusing volatile situations when they are acting wholly out of self-preservation. See supra
notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
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Although Quarles and its progeny relied on the difference between
questions intended to elicit confessions and those intended to preserve
the public safety, this distinction fails as a standard. The distinction
is important, but it invites ill advised journeys into the subjective
motivations of police officers.22 Evaluating dual-purpose questions only
further blurs the distinction. Instead, the exception requires clear
and consistent standards.
Perhaps a laundry list of requirements could guide courts in inter-
preting Quarles. Each public safety exception case would require a
court to consider six elements as the exception's prima facie case.
The court must first determine whether the suspect created an im-
mediate or future danger. A future danger affords officers an oppor-
tunity to use sound police tactics and technology rather than relying
on self incriminating statements. The second element requires the
court to determine whether the suspect posed a real rather than a
hypothetical danger to the public safety.m The more speculative the
danger, the weaker the Quarles claim. Third, the court must consider
whether police could use any viable alternatives to defuse the situation
without offending Miranda.6 Fourth, the court must address the
duration of the questioning and the number of questions. Extended
questioning and multiple questions indicate "actual coercion" under
the Quarles standard.
The fifth consideration is whether officers sought to locate a missing
weapon.m If officers did seek a missing weapon, the court should
employ a two-part analysis: whether the officers reasonably believed
in the existence of a missing weapon, and what type of weapon was
involved. The exception should not excuse inquiries designed solely
to gather evidence of a crime. Presumably, the exception would include
firearms but exclude knives, crowbars, drugs, and aluminum suit-
cases.m Finally, the court must look for possible accomplices. Again,
322. This journey has been rejected by both the Innis and Quarles Courts. See supra note
119 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
324. Self-disclosure is a poor substitute for legitimate police investigation.
325. See Brady, 819 F.2d at 884; see also supra notes 233, 272-73 and accompanying text.
326. In Quarles, for example, the officers had sufficient time to cordon off the store, warn
store employees, and conduct a brief search of the supermarket. See supra notes 85-90 and
accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
328. Not all inquiries over the location of a weapon should trigger the exception. See supra
text accompanying note 225.
329. See supra notes 91-98, 201-13 and accompanying text.
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this element must be real rather than hypothetical; the prosecution
must demonstrate an officer's reasonable belief in the presence of
accomplices within the suspect's immediate vicinity.
Must the prosecution in a prima facie case for the public safety
exception satisfy all six of the elements? Some elements may not apply
to a given situation; others may apply, but fail for some reason.o
Perhaps the prosecution should satisfy at least the first three ele-
ments.3 1 A court could determine the necessity of fulfilling each of
the three remaining elements. For example, a missing knife should
normally preclude the application of Quarles.33 However, a missing
knife in a crowded barroom where a gang encounter has just occurred
may trigger Quarles. Judicial discretion to assess the relevance of the
fourth, fifth, and sixth elements may produce a fairer result than
inflexible adherence to a rule.
To elucidate Quarles, courts could also incorporate the inevitable
discovery doctrine as a condition precedent to the public safety excep-
tion. m This would clarify application of the exception, particularly
when questioning occurs in or near a suspect's car, home, or business.
Courts may validly apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to fourth,
fifth, and sixth amendment contexts. In Quarles, for example, the
State would have had to show that police would have found the gun
without Quarles's unwarned statement.
The inevitable discovery doctrine works well with tangible evi-
dence, but not with testimonial evidence. The State would have to
prove that a suspect would have confessed even with the benefit of
Miranda warnings. Although some suspects eventually repeat their
incriminating statements to secure a favorable plea bargain or more
lenient sentence, the State would struggle to prove that a suspect
would inevitably have done so.13 Therefore, the inevitable discovery
doctrine as a condition precedent would destroy Quarles as a means
of admitting testimonial evidence obtained in violation of Miranda.
330. An example of an element not applying would be a hostage situation where the concern
is more for the location of a victim than of a gun. Another example is an exigent circumstance
created by a dangerous suspect with no sign of accomplices. An example of a failed element is
a situation such as Brady in which the danger was more imaginary than real. See United States
v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1032 (1988); see also supra
notes 258-83 and accompanying text.
331. These three elements may be the most essential aspects of the exception.
332. See supra notes 91-98, 244-57.
333. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
334. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 687 & n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The easiest way to resolve the confusion surrounding the public
safety exception is for the Supreme Court to reverse Quarles. This
would restore the constitutional presumption of coercion in custodial
interrogation settings. The overbreadth of Miranda potentially
excludes uncoerced confessions," but overbreadth is less harmful than
the prosecution versus defendant swearing contests sponsored by the
old voluntariness test.6 As long as Quarles remains good law, the
question of custodial interrogation as presumptively coercive is moot.
"Actual coercion" is now the standard, 337 as Quarles satisfies the pros-
ecution's interest in defusing volatile situations without sacrificing
convictions. The Quarles court failed to consider whether the prosecu-
tion really needs self incriminating statements to preserve convic-
tions.s Despite Quarles, the suspect's own lips are not the only source
of incriminating evidence. Miranda, once a bright-line rule, is now
essentially a suggestion, waived unknowingly by any suspect whom
the police happened to perceive as dangerous.
The present court is unlikely to overrule Quarles. Instead, the
Court has provided the ambitious prosecutor with an amorphous "ex-
ception" for admitting improperly obtained evidence at trial. The lower
courts' recent experience with the public safety exception demon-
strates that "compulsion" is once again a vague constitutional notion.
Because the Supreme Court has put the presumption of coercion out
to pasture, the lower courts have applied the standardless exception
as inconsistently as they once applied the fluctuating notion of "com-
pulsion" when self incrimination was a due process concept.m9 The
good-faith exception that blurs the fourth amendment concept of
"reasonableness" has invaded the fifth amendment as well 40 Police
officers, now empowered to ignore the warrant and warnings mandates
of the fourth and fifth amendments, are the new arbiters of criminal
defendants' constitutional rights. Daniel Brian Yeager
335. See id. at 684 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
336. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
337. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 n.7.
338. Warnings and the threat of exclusion had little impact on rates of confessions or
convictions following arrests. If the Court presumed that Miranda would shift the balance of
power from police to criminal suspects, it was mistaken. See Pepinsky, A Theory of Police
Reaction to Miranda v. Arizona, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 379 (1970).
339. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
340. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see supra note 106 and accompanying
text. Exceptions can be legitimate presumptions. For example, if Miranda presumes coercion,
then Quarles shifts the burden to the criminal defendant who threatens the public safety to
prove actual coercion. Unfortunately, this concept flies in the face of the presumption of innocence
and the privilege against self incrimination.
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